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“BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS ON THE GREEK
UPRISING IN 1821-1822: WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
OR WAR OF RELIGION?”
THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS*

In a dispatch of 10 April 1821 to Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, Britain’s
ambassador to the Sublime Porte (Lord Strangford) evoked the prevalence of
religious mentalities and religiously induced reprisals in the initial phase of the
Greek War of Independence. The sultan’s “government perseveres in its endeavours
to strike terror into the minds of its Greek subjects; and it seems that these efforts
have been very successful. The commerce of the Greeks has been altogether
suspended – their houses have been shut up – and an armed and licentious
population, wandering through the streets of this capital and its suburbs, daily
commit such excesses as destroy all confidence on the part of the reaya, in the
security of their lives and property.”1 This state of affairs “has been principally
excited by the official declarations emanating from the government, in which the
insurrections in Wallachia and Moldavia, and the rebellious movements in other
places, are attributed to a design formed by the Greeks, for the total overthrow of the
Mahometan religion. These declarations speak at once to the passions and prejudices
of the people, and it is not surprising that they should have produced in the minds of
Turks, the highest degree of fury and exasperation.”
In his copious reports to the London Foreign Office during his ambassadorship
from 1821 to 1824, Lord Strangford chronicled the turmoil in the sultan’s realm at a
tense but pivotal moment in the Eastern Question, that precarious web of European
penetration, intrigue, and rivalry in the remarkably resilient Ottoman Empire, still
possessing strategic lands and vital waterways in the Levant, or eastern
Mediterranean.2 Rebellion in Greece erupted. War between Russia and Turkey
* University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL. I gratefully acknowledge funding support from a
University of North Florida Summer Scholarship Grant in 2011.
1 The National Archives, Foreign Office (TNA, FO) 78/98, ff. 57-58a, 10 April 1821 (No. 16).
The term reaya refers to tax-paying non-Muslim, in particular Greek Christian, subjects of the
Porte.
2 The Eastern Question, or the Western Question from the viewpoint of the Ottoman government,
denotes the complex of feuds and crises in the Near East precipitated by the interplay of three
circumstances: first, the Ottoman Empire’s military, financial, and institutional weakening; second,
the contending claims, objectives, and interests of Britain, Russia, and other European great powers;
and third, the stirrings of Ottoman Christians, encompassing Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians,
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loomed. Ottoman restrictions disrupted European trade. Sectarian abuse and mutual
retribution deepened the clash. Ottoman court factions contested the sultan’s rule.
And border disputes sparked hostility between Turkey and Persia. As the Ottoman
Empire confronted an increasingly volatile situation, Strangford detailed the messy
realities at the core of the Eastern crisis, such as the spread of Greek-Ottoman
combat, the discord among Greek rebels, the debates among Ottoman officials about
an effective counter-insurgency strategy, and the dogged intercession of European
envoys like himself to pacify the Greek uprising and to avert a wider RussianTurkish war in the Balkans.3 He probed all of these ramifications, along with the
Albanians, Arabs, and Armenians, for autonomy and independence. The Eastern Question
extended from the late eighteenth century, with Russia’s emergence as a Black Sea power and
the onset of French revolutionary influence in the Balkans, to the demise of the Ottoman
Empire after World War I. The nineteenth century, when the interaction of the three
circumstances cited above produced a tangled series of crises and wars, marks the classic phase
of this geopolitical problem in European and Near Eastern affairs. The standard account of the
Eastern Question remains Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London:
Macmillan, 1966). Useful collections of relevant primary sources include Matthew S.
Anderson, ed., The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1971); Alexander Macfie, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (New York: Longman, 1996). For
a Russian perspective, see Vladimir A. Georgiev, Nina S. Kiniapina, Marina T. Panchenkova,
and Vitalii I. Sheremet, Vostochnyi vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii, konets XVIII-nachalo XX
v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1978). See Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), for an excellent general account of Imperial
Russia’s involvement in the Balkans and the Near East. Several Russian historians, drawing on
the wealth of documents in Russian archives, have addressed specific aspects of Russian policy
in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. See, for instance, Grigorii L. Arsh, Eteristskoe
dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); idem, Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional’noeosvoboditel’noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); Irina S. Dostian, Rossiia i
balkanskii vopros (Moscow: Nauka, 1972); Vitalii I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol’skii mir
1829 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); idem, Voina i biznes: vlast’, den’gi, i oruzhie. Evropa i
Blizhnii Vostok v novoe vremia (Moscow: Tekhnologicheskaia shkola biznesa, 1996). Also see
the studies by Ottoman specialists: Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire
Besieged (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007), especially 10-15; Nazan Çiçek, The
Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century (New
York: Tauris, 2011).
3 I am working on a four-volume compilation of Strangford’s dispatches during his four-year
ambassadorship at the Porte (1821-24). The first volume presents all his reports from 1821. See
Theophilus C. Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821): The Eastern Crisis,
volume I (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010); idem, “Eastern Orthodoxy under Siege in the Ottoman
Levant: A View from Constantinople in 1821,” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 24/25
(1008/2009): 39-72. On the internal and external challenges that destabilized and thus
restructured the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Aksan,
Ottoman Wars, 180-342; Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire,
1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 289-446; Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., The Cambridge
History of Turkey, volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), in particular the essays by Virginia Aksan (81-117), Dina Rizk Khoury
(135-56), and Fikret Adanir (157-85); Frederick F. Anscombe, ed., The Ottoman Balkans,
1750-1830 (Princeton, N. J.: Markus Wiener Publications, 2006), 1-9. European consuls often
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pursuit of British commercial and strategic aims in the troubled Levant. He also
conveyed Britain’s exaggerated fears of tsarist Russian infiltration of the region.
Equally crucial, and the focus of the documents excerpted below, British
embassy records reveal the religious dimension of the Greek-Ottoman contest. The
selected passages highlight in particular the execution of the ecumenical patriarch
and the selection of his successor; the atrocities committed against Muslim and
Eastern Orthodox subjects; the escalating cycle of sectarian violence and counterviolence; and the sultan’s concerted effort to distinguish between guilty rebels who
deserved punishment and innocent non-combatants who merited clemency. For each
side in the war, religious zeal transfigured the conflict into an ostensible battle
between Islam and Christianity. Often described as a modern revolution, stemming
from the dynamics of Western thought and practice – especially the march of
liberalism and nationalism – the fight for Greek independence disrupted the
established order of power and hastened the diffusion of secular ideas in the
Ottoman Balkans.4 Yet as a central event in modern Greek and Balkan history, with
European-wide resonance, the Greek struggle represented a strange mix of
traditional and modern elements: religious ardor and confessional identity interacted
with secular notions of liberty and nationality.5
Strangford arrived in the Ottoman capital in February 1821, with instructions
from Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to oversee various matters in British-Ottoman
relations. The newly appointed British ambassador had to maintain Britain’s

described the state of the Ottoman Empire during this turbulent era. See Theophilus C. Prousis,
British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant in An Age of Upheaval, 1815-1830
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008); Arsh Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 29-76; Eleutherios Prevelakis
and Kallia Kalliataki Mertikopoulou, eds., Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Revolution:
Consular Reports of William Meyer from Preveza, 2 vols., Monuments of Greek History, no. 12
(Athens: Academy of Athens, 1996).
4 Most of the essays in Petros Pizanias, ed., The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 2011), take this secular approach in addressing the origins, nature, and
impact of the Greek War of Independence.
5 On the significant impact of Eastern Orthodoxy on the concept and expression of both Greek
national consciousness and early Greek nationalism, see the essays by Marios Hatzopoulos,
“From resurrection to insurrection: ‘sacred’ myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of
Independence,” and Effi Gazi, “Revisiting religion and nationalism in nineteenth-century
Greece,” in The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the
Past (1797-1896), eds. Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2009), 81106. Also see Dimitris Livanios, “The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and
Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913,” in Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity
from Antiquity to Modernity, ed. Katerina Zacharia (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), especially
246-64. On the larger issue of how Western secular thought, in particular the Enlightenment
and Romantic nationalism, encountered and interacted with Eastern Orthodox culture and
tradition in the Ottoman Balkans, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism,
Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-eastern Europe (Brookfield,
Vt.: Variorum, 1994); idem, An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and Cultural
Encounters in Southeastern Europe (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate 2007).
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friendship and commerce with the Ottoman Empire, safeguard the rights of the
British-protected Ionian Islands, and amicably adjust any quarrels that might
provoke hostilities between Ottoman Turkey and Persia. He also had the task of
“cultivating the best possible understanding with your [European] colleagues at
Constantinople” and endeavoring, “when you shall think it necessary to do so, to
promote…harmony and good understanding between their governments and the
Sublime Porte.”6
Within two weeks of his arrival, the Eastern Question – the vexing problem
facing Europe’s statesmen – detonated, and Strangford had to deal with all the
fallout from the unfolding Greek agitation against Ottoman authority.
Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek general in the Russian army, and a Constantinople
native from a wealthy and influential aristocratic family, crossed the Pruth River
from Russian Bessarabia and launched his ill-fated uprising in Moldavia on 22
February/6 March 1821. Intending to raise an army of volunteers, Ypsilanti hoped to
liberate Balkan Orthodox Christians and to deliver Greece from Ottoman rule. His
supporters not only plundered resources but perpetrated excesses against local Turks
at various places in Moldavia, including the port of Galatz and Jassy. Tudor
Vladimirescu, a peasant-born revolutionary and military captain from Wallachia,
who had served with the tsarist army in the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-12,
facilitated the Ypsilanti undertaking by instigating his own abortive rebellion.
Beginning in February in his native Wallachia, Vladimirescu led an armed
insurrection, with the aims of advancing the political interests of the lesser nobility,
easing the economic hardship and social oppression of the peasantry, and liberating
Wallachia from Greek Phanariote and Ottoman control.7 Although both rebels
appealed to Tsar Alexander I for help, their exploits failed miserably. The tsar
immediately condemned these adventures and unequivocally rejected calls for
assistance; he dismissed Ypsilanti from Russian service, banned the latter’s re-entry
into Russia, and revoked Vladimirescu’s Russian protection. The tsar also condoned
the Porte’s military expedition to crush their treason and to restore tranquility (and
Ottoman suzerainty) in the strategically situated Danubian Principalities.
6 TNA, FO 78/97, ff. 3-13a, 14 October 1820 (No. 2). On the life and diplomatic career of Lord
Strangford (1780-1855), see G. Le G. Norgate, rev. H. C. G. Matthew, “Smythe, Percy Clinton
Sydney, sixth Viscount Strangford,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 51 (2004): 466-67;
Edward Barrington De Fonblanque, Lives of the Lords Strangford, with Their Ancestors and
Contemporaries through Ten Generations (London: Cassell Petter and Galpin, 1877), 107-203. On
the structure, organization, and personnel of the British embassy in Constantinople, see Geoff R.
Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident
Embassy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 24-58, 75-81, 98-109.
7 Phanariotes, Greek notables from the Phanar district of Constantinople, often descended from
Byzantine nobility and had close ties to the ecumenical patriarchate. They served the sultan as
bankers, merchants, diplomats, and interpreters; also as governors or hospodars of Moldavia and
Wallachia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Christine M. Philliou, Biography of
an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2011), xx-xxix, 5-37, for a concise introduction to this Ottoman elite group.
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Moreover, Vladimirescu’s Wallachia-focused social and national agenda collided
with Ypsilanti’s more ambitious Greece-centered designs, resulting in reciprocal
tension and suspicion. Vladimirescu demanded that Ypsilanti’s followers leave
Wallachia and refused to join them in fighting Ottoman troops; he even tried to
convince the Porte that he had nothing to do with the Ypsilanti upheaval and that he
simply wanted to end Greek Phanariote misrule in Wallachia. Apprehensive of
Vladimirescu’s loyalty and conviction, Ypsilanti ordered the arrest and execution of
his Romanian counterpart. Defeated decisively by Ottoman troops in June 1821,
Ypsilanti fled to Transylvania, where he endured arrest and incarceration by
Habsburg authorities, not to mention the ignominy of subsequent historians who
have disparaged his leadership and practical abilities.8 Yet his ill-conceived venture
kindled successful revolts in Ottoman-ruled Greek lands, outbreaks collectively
known as the Greek War of Independence.
The Greek revolution, erupting in the Danubian Principalities and extending to
the Morea, Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Aegean Archipelago, spawned an
Eastern cataclysm with European-wide repercussions. The established order of
legitimacy confronted the principles of liberty and nationality, and the unrest
morphed into the prolonged Greek conflict.9 This struggle drained Ottoman
8 Alexander Ypsilanti (1792-1828) and Tudor Vladimirescu (c. 1780-1821), for their romantic
dreams and political agendas, also for their Danubian debacles, hold a prominent place in the
history of the Ottoman Balkans. On the Ypsilanti upheaval in Moldavia, and the Vladimirescu
rising in Wallachia, see Keith Hitchins, The Romanians, 1774-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996), 141-55; Radu R. Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities:
A Problem in Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy, 1821-1854 (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies,
1997), 97-122; Eric Ditmar Tappe, “The 1821 Revolution in the Rumanian Principalities,” in The
Struggle for Greek Independence, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1973), 135-55. Also see
the good accounts written by two British participants in the Greek struggle: Thomas Gordon,
History of the Greek Revolution, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood; London: Cadell,
1832; reprint, Elibron Classics, 2005), 1: 86-124; George Finlay, History of the Greek
Revolution, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1861; reprint, Elibron
Classics, 2005), 1: 134-70. For more on Alexander Ypsilanti, see Grigorii L. Arsh, “Ipsilanti v
Rossii,” Voprosy istorii, no. 3 (1985): 88-101 (an English translation appears in Balkan Studies,
no. 1 (1985): 73-90); idem, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 154-56, 208-10, 238-319, 322-37,
344-50; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 206-13; Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The
Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1977), 40-42, 88-89.
9 On the Greek revolution, see Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 285-305; David Brewer, The Greek War of
Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman Oppression and the Birth of the
Modern Greek Nation (Woodstock, N. Y.: Overlook Press, 2003); Richard Clogg, A Concise
History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 33-46; Christopher M.
Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History (London: Faber and Faber, 5th ed., 1998), 13556; idem, The Greek War of Independence: Its Historical Setting (London: Hutchinson’s
University Library, 1952); Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833
(London: Batsford, 1973); Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece (London: Hodder Education,
2001), 9-28. For an introduction to Greek historiography on the subject, see the essays in
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resources and revenues; stoked dissension among factionalized Greeks; provoked
outside intervention that resulted in an independent Greek kingdom; and inspired
incendiary outbursts in Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. In addition, the Greek
insurgency eventually led the Porte to accelerate its program of centralizing reforms
for the purpose of modernizing the Empire.10 Already in the opening months of the
disturbance, European envoys and consuls had to cope with the seemingly
intractable realities of the Eastern emergency: the flare-up of sectarian strife, the
dislocation of trade, the upsurge in piracy, and the risk of war between Russia and
Turkey, especially after the Russian legation severed official ties with the Porte and
left Constantinople in the summer of 1821.
The religious and nationalistic fervor of the Greek-Ottoman collision became
readily evident as each side committed cruelties that escalated the feud into a war of
retribution, a sequence of butchery and slaughter. In the turbulent early weeks and
months of the Greek revolt, arbitrary Ottoman attacks targeted Greek churches,
shops, and clergy, in Constantinople, Adrianople, Smyrna, Salonica, Crete, and
Cyprus, usually in retaliation for Greek aggression against Turks in the Morea and
Moldavia and for Greek confiscations of Turkish properties.11 What most Greek
Pizanias, ed., The Greek Revolution of 1821. The Greek revolt exerted an immediate and
profound impact on great power politics and diplomacy in the Near East. For this European,
including Russian, perspective on the Eastern quagmire of the 1820s, see Anderson, The
Eastern Question, 1-77; Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 614-21, 637-64; idem, Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith,
1820-1823 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), 164-94, 223-25; Anatolii V. Fadeev,
Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1958).
10 With the benefit of Ottoman archival documents, several scholars have examined the effect of
the Greek rising on Ottoman reforms of administrative and military institutions and on the
ruling hierarchy’s exposure to such secular concepts as nation, citizen, liberty, and national
independence. See Hakan Erdem. “‘Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural labourers’: Ottoman
responses to the Greek War of Independence,” in Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and
Turkey, eds. Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas (New York: Routledge, 2005), 67-84; idem (Yusuf
Hakan Erdem), “The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old Ottoman Order,” in The Greek
Revolution of 1821, ed. Pizanias, 257-64; Nikos Theotokas and Nikos Kotaridis, “Ottoman
Perceptions of the Greek Revolution,” in The Greek Revolution of 1821, ed. Pizanias, 265-73. Also
see Vitalii Sheremet, “The Greek Revolution of 1821: A New Look at Old Problems,” Modern
Greek Studies Yearbook 8 (1992): 45-55.
11 William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of
Independence (Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2nd rev. ed., 2008), 1-12, 35-39, 41-49,
78, 328-29, balances the oft-told story of Ottoman atrocities against Greek Christians with
examples of equally brutal excesses by Greeks against Turks. Gallant, Modern Greece, 19-20,
writes: “The combination of irregular bands of former brigands thirsting for booty and
oppressed Christian peasants hungry for revenge against their overlords was a lethal one. When
the Turkish-held fortresses [in the Peloponnese] capitulated, bloodbaths ensued: as much as
one-third to one-half of the Moslem population fell to the insurgents’ bullets and blades. To be
sure, each side could tell its tales of butchery and slaughter.” Misha Glenny, The Balkans:
Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Viking Penguin, 2000), 2829, speaks of “a reciprocal orgy of violence” that broke out in the Morea and Rumelia. On the

BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS ON THE GREEK UPRISING IN 1821-1822

177

rebels regarded as a surge for liberty often turned into indiscriminate assaults against
Turkish and Albanian Muslim communities, often perpetrated by brigands in quest
of booty or oppressed peasants eager for revenge. In the words of acclaimed Balkan
historian Leften Stavrianos: “The Greek successes were stained by large-scale
massacres of defenseless Turks – an inevitable accompaniment, perhaps, of a
struggle that pitted, at one and the same time, Greek subjects against Turkish
overlords, Greek peasants against Turkish landowners, and Greek Christians against
Turkish Moslems.”12
Excesses of this sort also marked the internecine confrontations among Greek
rebel factions, and their distrust and division only exacerbated the revolutionary
situation. Social, political, and regional fractures hampered any notion of a unified
military campaign against the Porte and contributed to a multiplicity of interests,
intentions, and aims among the insurgents. Balkan historian Dennis Hupchick
elaborates on this convoluted nature of the Greek revolt: “The Greek uprising [in the
Morea] initially was more a widespread bandit movement than an authentic
revolution. Its leaders fought only when it suited them, and their forces were
uncoordinated and often mutually antagonistic. Most had no concept of nationalist
ideals and acted simply in the time-honored fashion of brigands, seeking freedom
from local Ottoman authority and booty from Muslim civilians, thousands of whom
they slaughtered or drove out. The Aegean island rebel leaders operated as a
freewheeling pirate fraternity, wreaking havoc on the Ottomans’ sea communications. Old regional and class rivalries pitted Peloponnesians against continentals,
islanders against mainlanders, Phanariotes against bandit leaders, upper against
lower clergy, landowning prelates against peasants, and shipowners against sailors.
Despite the intense differences, the chaotic activity initially amounted to a
successful guerilla war against weak Ottoman regional forces.”13
It should be pointed out, however, that Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V, a
formal representative of the Ottoman ruling hierarchy as head of the Greek
Orthodox millet – the religious community of Orthodox faithful that owed its
relative autonomy to Ottoman and Islamic rule – staunchly rejected the revolutionary implications of Western secular thought and thus excommunicated all
agitators and their supporters. The patriarch swiftly denounced the “evil spirit” of an
upheaval that transgressed God’s will, namely, the sultan’s divinely ordained and
imperishable sovereignty. Greek insurrectionists, by their apostasy and sin, only
displayed ingratitude to their Ottoman benefactors, increased the sultan’s wrath, and
rage, frenzy, and killing in Constantinople and elsewhere during the first year of the insurgency,
see Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 184-94, 230-31, 233-47, 315-16; Finlay,
History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 146-49, 172, 180-88, 197-99, 214-15, 225-57, 262-71.
12 Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1958), 284.
13 Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (New York: Palgrave,
2002), 221-22. For more on the splits and divisions among Greek rebels, see Brewer, The Greek
War of Independence, 124-28, 181-93; Glenny, The Balkans, 29-34; Gallant, Modern Greece,
17-18.
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endangered fellow Orthodox Christians. As wrongdoers, these malcontents indeed
threatened to bring harm and ruin to loyal and thus innocent subjects.14
For its part, the government of Sultan Mahmud II interpreted the mutiny as a
battle between Islam and Christianity and called for holy war. The Porte condemned
Ypsilanti’s rebelliousness as “the Greek sedition,” a Russian-instigated plot to
arouse the Greeks “in order to trample upon the Muslims.” As traitors who sought to
subvert Ottoman political authority, mutineers vented their religious hatred and “had
evil designs against Islam.” Accordingly, imperial decrees from the sultan to
provincial pashas, requesting their help in this time of danger, declared that “the aim
of the infidels was to inflame the peaceful [reaya] and, God forbid, to annihilate all
Muslims.”15 Governors responded with statements of solidarity, pledging to defend
both Islam and the Ottoman state. As the fighting spread, the sultan ordered the
punishment of prominent and influential Greeks in the Orthodox millet, identifying
them as responsible for the Greeks’ insubordination and resorting to severe measures
to frighten the insurgents into obedience. The uprising obliged the sultan not just to
punish culpable rebel-traitors who defied Ottoman authority but also to promise
clemency for innocent law-abiding reaya.
The most notorious of these abuses, the Ottoman regime’s public execution of
Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V, on Easter Sunday in April 1821, prompted
outrage and reproach from European envoys and ignited Russian Orthodox
sympathy for Greek coreligionists. Despite the fact that he had already
excommunicated Ypsilanti and other Greek seditionists for rebelling against their
lawful ruler, Grigorios stood guilty of treason in the eyes of the Porte for failing to
14 The ecumenical patriarch and other prominent church hierarchs anathematized the Greek revolt
and excommunicated Ypsilanti along with his followers and supporters. See Richard Clogg, ed.
The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821: A Collection of Documents (London:
Macmillan, 1976), 203-06; Charles A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece,
1821-1852 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 28-29. The official Ottoman
designation for Orthodox Christian subjects, Millet-i Rum or Greek Orthodox millet (religious
nation or community), encompassed all Orthodox believers, regardless of ethnicity, in the
sultan’s realm. By the early nineteenth century, Greeks and Hellenized Orthodox clerics
controlled the ecclesiastical sees, coffers, and administrative offices of the millet hierarchy. See
Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire,” in Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard
Lewis, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1: 185-202.
15 For coverage of Ottoman official reactions to the Greek uprising, see Erdem, “‘Do not think of
the Greeks as agricultural labourers’: Ottoman responses to the Greek War of Independence,” in
Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey, eds. Birtek and Dragonas, 67-73. Also see
these essays in Pizanias, ed., The Greek Revolution of 1821: H. Şükrü Ilicak, “The Revolt of
Alexandros Ipsilantis and the Fate of the Fanariots in Ottoman Documents,” 225-39; Sophia
Laiou, “The Greek Revolution in the Morea According to the Description of an Ottoman
Official,” 241-55; Erdem, “The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old Ottoman Order,” 260-63;
Theotokas and Kotaridis, “Ottoman Perceptions of the Greek Revolution,” 268-70. Philliou,
Biography of an Empire, 65-81, emphasizes the importance of religion and religious symbols in
Mahmud II’s response to the 1821 upheaval.
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maintain the Eastern Orthodox community’s allegiance to the sultan. The defiled
corpse of the patriarch – left hanging in public for three days, dragged through the
streets of the capital, and tossed into the Golden Horn – symbolized Ottoman
suppression of Eastern Orthodox Christians.16 The fate of the patriarch, together
with the persecution of numerous bishops and clergy, not only deepened
denominational animosity but turned the Greek rising into a sanctified crusade
characterized by mutual cruelty and atrocity, “a series of opportunistic massacres.”17
Arrests, executions, and confiscated properties incited excess by each side in a
widening war, with prisoners and hostages, most of them non-participants, paying
the highest price.
The heart of the Eastern crisis in 1821, notwithstanding the seriousness of sectarian
frenzy, remained the threat of war embroiling the great powers, in particular Russia,
which had to balance her national interests in the Near East with her adherence to the
Concert of Europe. Strategic, trade, and religious pursuits in the unsettled Levant did
not mesh well with the preservation of the political status quo in Europe, and friction
between these competing considerations underscored the complexity of the Eastern
Question for Russia. Already before 1821, disputes over Russian claims in the
Caucasus and the Danubian Principalities strained ties with the Porte, and the rebellion
only magnified the discord.18

16 On the fate of the ecumenical patriarch, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent
Greece, 22-35; Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 72-73, 210, 213; Brewer, The Greek War of
Independence, 103-11; Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution
(DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 28, 55-56; Robert Walsh, A Residence
at Constantinople, 2 vols. (London: F. Westley and A. H. Davis, 1836), 1: 311-20. On reprisal
attacks and sectarian strife in Salonica, see Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts:
Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430-1950 (New York: Knopf, 2005), 125-30. Justin McCarthy,
Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 (Princeton, N. J.:
Darwin Press, 1995), 10-13, argues that the Greek revolt established a pattern of excesses and
atrocities against Ottoman Muslims, a tendency that lasted until the end of the Ottoman Empire.
Greek forces massacred thousands of Muslim men, women, and children in the Morea as well
as in Missolonghi, Galatz, and Jassy, not so much out of hatred but out of a calculated political
strategy to foster national unity by removing Turkish ethnic and religious communities. Ethnic
cleansing of this sort, according to McCarthy, accompanied subsequent struggles for national
independence by Balkan Christians.
17 St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free, 92, states that by the early summer of 1822, the
Greek revolution “had cost the lives of upwards of 50,000 Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and
others. Many more had been reduced to slavery or misery. Only a tiny minority had been killed
in direct combat with the enemy. The Greek War of Independence hitherto was hardly a war at
all in the conventional sense, but largely a series of opportunistic massacres. The dead Turks
were not for the most part the soldiers of the Sultan nor the dead Greeks the revolutionaries; the
victims had simply paid the price of belonging in their respective circumstances to the weaker
community and the wrong religion.”
18 On Russian-Ottoman disagreements from the Congress of Vienna to the Ypsilanti fiasco, see
Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros, 129-95; Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 24-41;
Sheremet, Voina i biznes, 207-18.
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In taking measures to crush the Greek mutiny, the Porte infringed upon specific
articles in Russian-Ottoman treaties and thus antagonized official relations between the
two Empires. Reprisals against the Greeks breached the Porte’s promise in the Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) to shelter the faith and churches of Ottoman Orthodox
Christians.19 Trade obstacles seemingly contravened Russia’s right of unimpeded
merchant navigation in the Straits, guaranteed by Kutchuk-Kainardji and the Treaty of
Commerce (1783). The Porte’s dismissal of the hospodars (governors) of Moldavia and
Wallachia, accusing them of abetting the agitation, undermined the sultan’s imperial
decree of 1802, and subsequent stipulations in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812),
sanctioning Russian consent in the appointment and deposition of hospodars. Facing
strong public clamor for intervention on behalf of persecuted Greeks, and despite urgent
calls by high-ranking officials for military action to rectify broken treaties, Alexander I
upheld the order of legitimacy. The tsar deplored the rebellion as a menace to Europe’s
peace and security and to the principles of monarchical solidarity and political stability;
he also advocated the Porte’s swift suppression of the disorders before they engulfed
other regions. At the same time, the tsarist regime requested the strict observance of
treaties, intent on using them as instruments for exerting pressure on Turkey.
The Foreign Ministry’s dual approach of censuring the revolt but insisting on
complete compliance with treaty accords became the basis for Russian policy in 1821.
Russia’s ambassador in Constantinople, Grigorii A. Stroganov, rebuked the insurrection
but remonstrated for Orthodox brethren, protested violations of trade clauses, and
counseled moderation and restraint in Ottoman treatment of non-insurgent Greek
Christians.20 For a host of reasons, however, the Porte strongly suspected Russian
complicity in the commotion: Russia’s past wars against Turkey; her self-proclaimed
19 The landmark Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) ended Ottoman hegemony over the Black
Sea region and marked Imperial Russia’s emergence as a Near Eastern power. In addition to the
commercial, consular, and territorial concessions granted to Russia, the treaty stipulated that the
sultan would protect Orthodox Christians in the Aegean Archipelago, the Danubian
Principalities, and western Georgia. The tsarist government subsequently, and speciously,
declared that this pledge gave Russia leverage to interfere in Ottoman affairs on behalf of all
Orthodox Christians. On this significant but controversial treaty, see Theophilus C. Prousis,
Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant: The Dashkov Archive, Minnesota Mediterranean and
East European Monographs, no. 10 (Minneapolis: Modern Greek Studies Program, University
of Minnesota, 2002), 5-7, 142; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 157-60; Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., The
Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, volume 1, European
Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 1975), 92-101; Roderic H.
Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1990), 29-59.
20 On Russia’s official policy toward the Greek uprising of 1821, in particular the tsar’s delicate
balancing act between upholding legitimacy and intervening on behalf of Greek coreligionists,
see Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, 26-30, 185-87; idem, Russian-Ottoman
Relations in the Levant, 25-27; Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 49-75; Dostian,
Rossiia i balkanskii vopros,196-238; Fadeev, Rossiia i vostochnyi vopros, 36-91; Sheremet,
Voina i biznes, 218-86; Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government,
and Society, 1815-1833 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 104-21, 161-67.
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guardianship of Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule; her generous support of
Greek migration to southern Russia, in particular the distribution of land grants and tax
exemptions to Greek settlements in recently annexed Ottoman territories; and her
extensive network of Greek protégés in Black Sea and Aegean commerce. Furthermore,
Greek merchants in Odessa participated in the national ferment that produced the
Philiki Etaireia (Society of Friends), the secret society that launched the insurgence of
1821. Founded in Odessa (1814) and headquartered in Kishinev, this conspiratorial
organization recruited members and monies from Greek centers in Russia and came
under the leadership of Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek general in the Russian army and
an aide-de-camp of the tsar. Plus, Russia refused to extradite rebels who fled to
Bessarabia, in particular the hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutso, who joined the
Philiki Etaireia and took part in the Ypsilanti rising.21 Treaty provisos crumbled not just
because of the Porte’s plausible, but mistaken, accusations of the Russian government’s
entanglement in the subversion but because of the outbreak of sectarian rage in
Constantinople, Smyrna, and elsewhere. Ironically, treaties that sought to maintain
cordial ties between Russia and Turkey and to safeguard Russian activities in the Near
East did neither.
In an ultimatum delivered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Russia demanded the
evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Danubian Principalities, the restoration of
damaged churches and religious properties, the protection of Orthodox Christians, and
the guarantee of commercial rights. If the sultan did not accept these terms, Russia
would have to offer asylum and assistance to all Christians subjected to “blind
fanaticism.”22 The expiration of the Russian note’s prescribed eight-day deadline
without the Porte’s full compliance, followed by Ambassador Stroganov’s departure
from the Ottoman capital, severed official relations between Russia and Turkey, the two
realms most profoundly affected by the uproar of 1821. Thus began a strange twilight
period of no war yet no peace. Alexander I proved reluctant to act unilaterally without
the sanction of the Concert of Europe and dreaded the prospect of a Russian-Turkish
21 On these various connections between Russia and the Greeks, see Prousis, Russian Society and
the Greek Revolution, 3-24; Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 129-76, 200-22, 245-96.
Precisely because of these deep-seated Russian-Greek ties, the Ottoman government suspected
Russia’s direct involvement in the Greek agitation. On the Porte’s Russophobia in 1821, see
Ilicak, “The Revolt of Alexandros Ipsilantis and the Fate of the Fanariots in Ottoman
Documents,” in The Greek Revolution of 1821, ed. Pizanias, 225-39. Prince Michael Soutso,
hospodar of Moldavia in 1821, greatly assisted the Ypsilanti rebellion with his own personal
fortune, along with money and supplies from his Danubian province. When tsarist troops failed
to intervene on behalf of Ypsilanti, Soutso abdicated his hospodarship and fled with his family
to Russian-controlled Bessarabia. See Brewer, The Greek War of Independence, 52, 54, 56-57;
Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 289-90, 331, 342; Hitchins, The Romanians, 143, 147-48.
22 The tsarist ultimatum of 6/18 July 1821 appears in print in Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR,
Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.: Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva
inostrannykh del, 17 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1960-2005), 12: 203-10. The old style Julian
calendar, used in Russia until 1918, lagged twelve days behind the new style Gregorian
calendar in the nineteenth century.
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clash that would disrupt the status quo, incite revolts elsewhere, and jeopardize the
balance of power in Europe. Firmly committed to the Concert of Europe, the tsar
suspected that a Jacobin directing committee in Paris had instigated trouble in the
Balkans. Yet the Eastern quagmire thickened, Greek-Ottoman fighting intensified,
Russian-Ottoman affairs festered, and treaty vows shattered amid war and revolution in
the Levant.
Britain encountered her own dilemma over the Eastern Question quandary, an
“unsolved problem, pregnant with vital and incalculable consequences.”23 Foreign
Secretary Castlereagh sympathized with the Greek cause on moral and humanitarian
grounds but regarded the Greeks as insurrectionists against the established hierarchy, a
political order that he associated with the Concert of Europe and its defense of
geopolitical security in Europe. His mixed reaction reflected the competing currents of
philhellenic enthusiasm and non-interventionist thinking that prevailed in numerous
sectors of British government and society.24 He also considered Russian claims to
protect Greek Christians a cover for expansionist designs, thus confronting Britain and
the other powers with the twin dangers of a Russian-Ottoman war and an extension of
tsarist sway in the Near East. While the interests of humanity and religion called for
European intervention to rescue Greek Orthodox Christians from reprisals, tsarist
interference would accelerate the demise of the Ottoman Empire, upset the balance of
power in Europe, and challenge British maritime strength in the eastern Mediterranean.
Britain remained neutral in the Greek-Ottoman feud of 1821 yet pursued her own
strategic, political, and commercial ends. Above all, Castlereagh resolved to avert war
between Russia and Turkey, to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the
perceived peril of Russian expansion, to extend British trade in the Levant, and to
secure the land and sea routes to India.25
23 Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European
Alliance (London: G. Bell, 2nd ed., 1934), 349.
24 Philhellenism as a European movement expressed admiration of classical antiquity, sympathy
for fellow Christians, and support of Greek freedom. See Brewer, The Greek War of
Independence, 135-53; St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free; David Roessel, In Byron’s
Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 13-97; Douglas Dakin, British and American Philhellenes during the
War of Greek Independence, 1821-1833 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1955);
Christopher M. Woodhouse, The Philhellenes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969); Denys
Barau, La cause des Grecs: une histoire du mouvement philhellène (1821-1829) (Paris: Honoré
Champion Editions, 2009). On the literary philhellenism of Shelley and Byron, see Jennifer
Wallace, Shelley and Greece: Rethinking Romantic Hellenism (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997); Timothy Webb, “Romantic Hellenism,” in The Cambridge Companion to British
Romanticism, ed. Stuart Curran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 148-76;
Terence Spencer, Fair Greece, Sad Relic: Literary Philhellenism from Shakespeare to Byron
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).
25 On British policy under Foreign Secretary Castlereagh toward the Greek insurgence and the
larger Eastern crisis in 1821-22, see Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 349-86;
Charles W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the
Near East, 1821-1833 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1930; reprint, New York: H. Fertig,
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All of these ramifications of the Greek unrest, including British neutrality,
framed Strangford’s responses to the Eastern predicament. Despite his considerable
skill, finesse, and energy in striving to calm Russian-Ottoman antagonism and to pacify
the Greek dispute, he remains a controversial figure. As the chief representative of
British policy in the Near East, he chided Stroganov for his harsh tone toward the Porte
and falsely implicated several tsarist officials, including Russia’s ambassador, in the
subversive Philiki Etaireia. Yet Strangford worked tirelessly with European and
Ottoman counterparts to neutralize a dangerous situation, to shield Orthodox Christians,
and to re-establish tranquility in Moldavia and Wallachia. He became convinced that
the Porte’s timely restoration of order, most notably the safekeeping of sacred shrines
and the evacuation of troops from the Danubian Principalities, would forestall RussianTurkish hostilities. Through steadfast negotiation, Strangford and his colleagues sought
to prevent a great power war and to defuse the Greek insurgency.26 Strangford’s stance
and attitude, expressed in his many letters to Castlereagh, remind us of the wealth of
primary sources that await scrutiny by historians of the Eastern Question.
From the onset of the Ypsilanti-led uprising, and amid indirect evidence of
Russian complicity in the disturbance, Strangford anticipated friction between
Russia and Turkey. He recounted their swelling acrimony, especially over the plight
of Eastern Orthodoxy in the sultan’s domain and the severity of Ottoman military
actions in Moldavia and Wallachia. After the Ottoman army drove out remnants of
the Philiki Etaireia, a military administration reinforced Ottoman suzerainty in the
Danubian Principalities, but at a heavy economic cost to the local population.27 With
Russian-Ottoman dialogue at an impasse over these issues, and with growing fear of
a war with Russia, Strangford tried to mollify the disagreement by urging the reis
efendi, or Ottoman foreign minister, to demonstrate moderation and conciliation.

1973), 17-42; John Lowe, Britain and Foreign Affairs, 1815-1885: Europe and Overseas ( New
York: Routledge, 1998), 26-27; John Derry, Castlereagh (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976),
212-15; Christopher J. Bartlett, Castlereagh (London: Macmillan, 1966), 225-28; Charles R.
Middleton, The Administration of British Foreign Policy, 1782-1846 (Durham, N. C.: Duke
University Press, 1977), 25-27, 106-09; Steven Schwartzberg, “The Lion and the Phoenix—
British Policy towards the ‘Greek Question’ 1831-32,” Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2 (1988):
143-50.
26 On Strangford’s efforts at the Porte, see the essay by Allan Cunningham (“Lord Strangford and
the Greek Revolt”) in Allan Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution:
Collected Essays, ed. Edward Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 188-232; Florescu, The
Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities, 109-12, 123-47; idem, “Lord Strangford
and the Problem of the Danubian Principalities, 1821-24,” Slavonic and East European Review 39,
no. 93 (1963): 472-88; Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 17-22; W. David
Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821-1831 (New York: Peter Lang,
1988), 156-62, 166-69, 177-86; Prousis, Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant, 22, 25, 27,
41-42, 73, 77; idem, British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant, 29-40 passim, 57, 66,
109, 114, 164; idem, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821), 39-364 passim.
27 Hitchins, The Romanians, 152-53. Roughly eleven thousand Ottoman troops occupied
Moldavia, and nine thousand remained in Wallachia, until the fall of 1822.
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Along with his foreboding of a Russian-Ottoman confrontation, Strangford
registered concern over the impending danger of anti-Greek reprisals – what he
termed “atrocious and sanguinary proceedings” and “a spirit of relentless
fanaticism.” Attacks against Greek Christian property and churches became all too
palpable to the British envoy, who bemoaned “the prolongation of that system of
sanguinary persecution.”28 Violent incidents heightened the mood of disquiet and
trepidation in Constantinople, especially at European embassies, obviously caught
off guard when the sultan ordered the execution of Constantine Mourousi, an
Ottoman Greek who served as grand dragoman (interpreter or translator) of the
Porte. The death of the ecumenical patriarch and other church hierarchs, faithfully
reported by Strangford, amplified the perceived sectarian character of the GreekOttoman collision. His dispatches portrayed an escalating Eastern flashpoint, fueled
largely by the danger of partisan slaughter in Constantinople and other embattled
areas. With indelible images and scenes, his writing evoked the religious wrath and
nationalistic ferocity that prolonged, as well as exemplified, the Greek-Ottoman fight.
Random and deliberate violence, retribution and excess, by both Greeks and Turks,
took place in Moldavia, Constantinople, Smyrna, Aivali, and Tripolitsa. A
progression of retaliation and vengeance exacerbated the Eastern emergency,
magnified the human cost of the conflict, and made diplomatic mediation all the
more difficult and imperative.
Perhaps the most infamous of these outrages occurred on the island of Chios.
The Chios catastrophe epitomized both the folly and the fury of the Greek
revolution, eliciting horrific reminders of fire and sword memorialized in Eugène
Delacroix’s edgy “Massacre at Chios” (1824), the expressive painting that inspired
European sympathy and support for the Greek cause. Located only five miles from
the Turkish mainland, Ottoman Chios enjoyed relative autonomy, prospered
economically, and blossomed into a commercial hub, perhaps the richest island in
the Aegean, perfectly situated along the main shipping routes in the Levant.
Renowned for its physical beauty, mild climate, fertile soil, and resourceful
population, and supposedly the birthplace of Homer, Chios featured merchantfunded schools, hospitals, and a printing press that produced new editions of the
ancient Greek classics. When a band of misguided adventurers from nearby Samos
landed in March 1822 and raised the flag of liberation, most Chiotes remained
skeptical; they understandably feared that Samiote foolhardiness and bravado might
jeopardize their coveted autonomy and prosperity. Cautious Chiotes questioned the
prospect of successful rebellion, given their island’s proximity to Turkey and its
distance from the main Greek naval base at Hydra. Fears became reality when the
Ottoman navy approached in April 1822. The Samiote “liberators” fled to the
mountains or to their awaiting boats, leaving Chios to a bitter fate of plunder,
savagery, and slavery. Ottoman regular and irregular forces exacted a terribly high
price in retribution – looting and burning the island, slaughtering unarmed residents,
28 TNA, FO 78/98: ff. 114-17, 25 April 1821 (No. 25); ff. 154-57, 10 May 1821 (No. 30).
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and enslaving thousands. Massacre, captivity, and flight diminished the island’s
Greek population from nearly 120,000 to some 20,000.29
Throughout these mounting pressures during the opening two years of the crisis,
Strangford counseled restraint and caution. He rebuffed Ottoman complaints that the
tsarist regime stood behind the Ypsilanti expedition. He advised the Porte to put its
trust in the tsar’s revulsion of revolution. He protested the execution of the patriarch.
And he repeatedly tried to assuage the anger and resentment that incited further
atrocities by the belligerents. Far from disloyal to Stroganov, he echoed his Russian
colleague on several crucial issues, yet criticized his provocative demeanor and
language, such as Stroganov’s sweeping assertion that “the co-existence of Turkey
with the other states of Europe has hitherto been endured [emphasis original] solely
under the tacit convention that she should treat her Christian subjects with
indulgence – that Russia was to be the judge of the degree and quality of that
indulgence, and that upon her feeling herself dissatisfied with the conduct of Turkey
towards the Greeks, she had a right, on proclaiming her dissatisfaction, to array
against the Turkish Empire the united force of all Christendom, and to declare its
existence to be incompatible with the stability and security of the Christian faith.” 30
Although Strangford did not succeed in thwarting a rupture in Russian-Ottoman
relations, he endeavored to reduce tensions and to renew diplomatic ties between the
two states. He exhorted the Porte to observe the strict letter of existing treaties – by
withdrawing Ottoman troops from the Danubian Principalities, by repairing
damaged churches, and by protecting Greek Orthodox subjects. He also urged the
Ottomans to pursue the war rigorously, but only against “guilty” fighters who
deserved punishment, and to spare “innocent” non-combatants in Constantinople
and elsewhere.
Strangford’s narratives reflect some of the flaws and limitations of primary sources
written by Europeans in the Ottoman Islamic world during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. His comments conveyed conventional Western perceptions of the
Ottoman Empire and stigmatized the Ottoman other with occasional distortion and
exaggeration. Envoys and consuls – and not just British representatives – depicted
Ottoman officialdom in a mostly negative light, accenting episodes of oppression,
extortion, and related abuses of power by pashas, janissaries, and customs officers.
Many of these authorities, portrayed as rapacious, corrupt, and arbitrary, interfered
in the administration of European diplomatic and commercial concessions – the
capitulations – and thus complicated European-Ottoman affairs. Through their
29 On the Chios disaster, see Brewer, The Greek War of Independence, 154-67, largely based on
the collection of contemporary diplomatic accounts, including some of Strangford’s dispatches,
in Philip P. Argenti, ed., The Massacres of Chios Described in Contemporary Diplomatic
Reports (London: John Lane, 1932). Also see St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free, 78-81,
227; Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 350-66; Finlay, History of the Greek
Revolution, 1: 306-21; Prousis, British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant, 29-32, 14447, 155-58, 245-46, 248.
30 TNA, FO 78/99, ff. 220a-21, 23 July 1821 (No. 71).
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anecdotes, remarks, and choice of words, Western records alluded to commonly
accepted European images of the Ottoman Empire, fast becoming “the sick man of
Europe” in Western political discourse and popular opinion.31
Yet Strangford’s dispatches elucidate some of the salient but neglected aspects of
the Eastern Question. He relied on a circle of sources, gathering intelligence from
merchants, travelers, protégés, consuls, and dragomans; from local and regional
Ottoman officials, including pashas and customs officers and their interpreters; and
from other European envoys. Sifting through these different accounts, he amended
his initial censure of the Ottoman government. He diligently chronicled what he
deemed the most critical realities in Constantinople, covering a range of topics
beyond the purely political and diplomatic facets of the accelerating Eastern crisis.
Moreover, with his access to high-ranking Ottoman authorities and their
deliberations, his correspondence contributes to our grasp of how Ottoman
officialdom perceived and reacted to the Greek sedition. The very specificity and
urgency of his reports sharpen our focus on the multiple issues, such as sectarian
friction and religiously tinged Russian-Ottoman tension, which marked an age of
upheaval in the Ottoman Levant.
In addition, British embassy observations and communiqués shed light on the
nature of Balkan society under Ottoman control. Despite growing exposure to
Western secular modernity, via trade and other avenues, religious zealotry and
communal carnage – instead of enlightened concepts – characterized much of the
initial struggle for Greek self-determination, constitutional rule, and national
independence. Even the first charter of insurgent Greece, the Constitution of
Epidaurus (1822), made religious affiliation a defining mark of political nationality,
identifying Greek citizens as all those Eastern Orthodox Christians who resided in
the areas of Greece and had taken up arms against Ottoman rule.32 Clearly, the vast
31 On the perceptions of European travelers, consuls, and other visitors who recorded their
observations of the Ottoman Levant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Allan
Cunningham, Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays, ed. Edward Ingram
(London: Frank Cass, 1993), 72-107; Edhem Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth
Century (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 172, 203-04, 218-26. For European attitudes toward Islam in
general and Ottoman Turkey in particular, see Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage,
1979); Norman Daniel, Islam, Europe and Empire (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966);
Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans: Dissolving Images (New York: Penguin, 1995). On British
literary and travelogue descriptions of the Ottoman Empire, see Gerald Maclean, The Rise of
Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580-1720 (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004); idem, Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Filiz Turhan, The Other Empire: British Romantic
Writings about the Ottoman Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003); Christine Laidlaw, The
British in the Levant: Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century
(New York: Tauris, 2010). Tsar Nicholas I coined the term “sick man” when referring to the
Ottoman Empire’s imminent demise. Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2011), 105; Trevor Royle, The Great Crimean War, 1854-1856 (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10, 26.
32 On the constitution of 1822, see John Koliopoulos, “’Modern Greece’: An Old Debate,” in
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majority of Ottoman Orthodox inhabitants clung to traditional, primarily religious,
mentalities in an Islamic theocratic setting; they remained fragmented or segmented
by region, class, education, and culture. Lastly, the Strangford papers illustrate the
value of untapped resources for probing some of the most significant events at the
epicenter of the Eastern Question. In this light, the passages presented here
constitute but a small part of the gleanings gathered by an international group of
scholars who, drawing upon Greek, Ottoman, and European archives, have clarified
our picture of the complexity and dynamics of the Greek revolution, including the
Ottoman response to this landmark happening in Balkan and Eastern Question
history.33
I have selected excerpts from Strangford’s dispatches in 1821 and 1822. All the
documents are located in the Foreign Office holdings of The National Archives,
Kew (TNA, FO). When the manuscript has a word or phrase underlined for
emphasis, I have placed this item in bold print.
FO 78/98, ff. 57-58a, 10 April 1821 (No. 16)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Porte’s reprisals against Greek subjects.]
…This government perseveres in its endeavours to strike terror into the minds of
its Greek subjects; and it seems that these efforts have been very successful. The
commerce of the Greeks has been altogether suspended – their houses have been
shut up – and an armed and licentious population, wandering through the streets of
this capital and its suburbs, daily commit such excesses as destroy all confidence on
the part of the reaya, in the security of their lives and property.
This state of things has been principally excited by the official declarations
emanating from the government, in which the insurrections in Wallachia and
Moldavia, and the rebellious movements in other places, are attributed to a design
formed by the Greeks, for the total overthrow of the Mahometan religion. These
declarations speak at once to the passions and prejudices of the people, and it is not
surprising that they should have produced in the minds of Turks, the highest degree
of fury and exasperation…

Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell, ed. Mark Mazower
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 132; Brewer, The Greek War of Independence,
125, 128-34; Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 298-99; Gordon, History of the Greek
Revolution, 1:323-27.
33 Along with the relevant scholarship cited above, especially in notes 10 and 15, see Antonis
Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolvos, eds., Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict,
Transformation, Adaptation (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and
Archaeology, 2007), in particular the essays by Rossitsa Gradeva (73-94), Panagiotis Stathis
(167-79), Christine Philliou (181-94), Christos Loukos (195-203), Vassilis Dimitriadis (20511), Hakan Erdem (213-40).
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FO 78/98, ff. 86-89, 21 April 1821 (No. 19)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the execution of Constantine Mourousi; the
departure of Ottoman troops for the Black Sea and the abuses they imposed; and the
disturbed state of affairs in the capital and its environs.]
…The departure of an Austrian courier enables me to acquaint Your Lordship
with the disgrace and execution of Prince Constantine Mourousi, dragoman of the
Porte. This unexpected event took place on the morning of the 16th instant. I have
the honour to enclose a translation of the paper which was attached to the dead body
of the prince, and which declares the cause of his punishment.
The Porte has not yet named a dragoman in place of Prince Mourousi, and the
relations of foreign missions with the Ottoman government are at present exposed to
considerable and inconvenient interruption.
The new grand vizier is arrived, and he enters this day on the business of his
office. The known severity of his character excites the utmost apprehensions among
the unfortunate Greeks of the capital.
About five thousand troops have been sent up the Black Sea. They are to
disembark at Varna [a Black Sea port in northern Bulgaria]. Their departure was, as
usual, the signal for every sort of disorder and violence, and the banks of the
Bosporus were for some days, the scene of the most disgraceful atrocities.
Some of the troops landed in various places, and pillaged several houses, among
which were some belonging to, or under the protection of foreign missions. During
their passage up the canal, they fired into several ships. Two Austrian sailors were
killed. The only satisfaction which we have been able to obtain for these insults, is
the continually renewed expression of the concern and regret which they have
occasioned at the Porte. In truth, the little attention which is paid to the complaints
of the foreign ministers here, when they are compelled to represent the violence and
insults which are offered to themselves, their families, and the subjects of their
respective courts, renders, at the present moment, the discharge of their public duties
a matter of no ordinary difficulty and to a certain degree, of personal danger to those
who are in their employment…
Translation of the notice, placed on the head of Prince Constantine Mourousi,
decapitated on 16 April 1821
This is the head of the traitor Costaki, the current dragoman of the Divan, who
dared to join and to become allies with the accursed who have had the temerity of
starting the sedition and the treason in Wallachia and in Moldavia; and having been
confirmed that he took part in this affair, and his treason having been brought to
light, it is for this reason that he has suffered capital punishment.
FO 78/98, ff. 114-17, 25 April 1821 (No. 25)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the execution of the ecumenical patriarch and
three Greek bishops on Easter Sunday and the cause of Prince Mourousi’s
execution.]
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…I am concerned to have to report a circumstance which too clearly proves the
determination of the Porte to keep no measures with its unfortunate Greek subjects.
At five o’clock on the evening of Easter Sunday, the good and venerable
patriarch, after performing the service of that solemn festival, was seized on his
departure from the church, and hanged at the gate, in the presence of an immense
multitude. Three more Greek bishops (those of Ephesus, Derkon, and Anchialos)
were executed at the same time, and in the same ignominious manner, but in
different quarters of Constantinople. They had been some time in confinement. I
enclose a translation of the label which has been fixed to the dead body of the bishop
of Ephesus.34 The patriarch was in the eighty-second year of his age, and of the most
exemplary character and conduct. It is said that his offence was his having aided the
family of Prince Demetrius Mourousi (brother to the lately executed dragoman of
the Porte) to escape from this country.35
These atrocious and sanguinary proceedings, and the peculiarly shocking
circumstances under which they have taken place, have excited the utmost
consternation among all classes not professing the Mahometan faith. They plainly
indicate that the councils of this Empire are now directed by a spirit of relentless
fanaticism from which the most dreadful results may be expected…
The cause of Prince Mourousi’s disgrace and execution is now ascertained. He
received a letter from Prince Ypsilanti, inviting him to participate in his projects. He
instantly communicated a translation of this letter to the Porte. The sultan demanded
to see the original letter; of which he caused a translation to be made by another
person. The second translation differed from the first, inasmuch as Prince Mourousi
had omitted or softened a paragraph in the original, which tended to compromise a
foreign power [Russia]. The indignation of the sultan was immediately and violently
excited, and the results were fatal to Prince Mourousi.36
34 The ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinople, the ecclesiastical center of the Eastern Orthodox
Church in the Ottoman Empire, oversaw regional and district administrative offices. These
metropolitanates and bishoprics included Ephesus (in Asia Minor), Derkon (near the Bosporus),
and Anchialos (in southeastern Bulgaria, along the Black Sea coast; Pomorie today). On the fate
of these and other church hierarchs, including the ecumenical patriarch, see Gordon, History of
the Greek Revolution, 1: 187-88; Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 229-34.
35 Walsh, A Residence at Constantinople, 1: 319, commented that “[n]o shadow of proof, or just
ground of suspicion, [was] ever stated against the patriarch, though two causes were assigned
by the Greeks for his death: the one was that the family of Mourousi, the dragoman of the
Porte, who were, after his death, placed under the care of the patriarch, were suffered to escape;
and the other, which was the real cause, was that he was a Moreote. The Turks carry their idea
of the liability of hostages to such an extent that they make every man responsible for the
actions of every other man of his nation. The insurrection had at this time spread to the Morea;
and news had just arrived that the Greeks had taken Kalavrita [a town in the northern
Peloponnese]. The patriarch was born in that district, and he was executed for the offences of
his countrymen. The effects of this wanton and causeless outrage upon all the Greeks held
sacred excited the profoundest horror and hatred among every member of their church.”
36 According to Walsh, A Residence at Constantinople, 1: 308-09, when the sultan “discovered the
omitted passage, [he] instantly ordered the execution of the dragoman.” Constantine
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(The minister of the power in question [Stroganov], has told me that the
suppressed paragraph was of another nature, and that it implied the existence of a
previous correspondence between Prince Ypsilanti and the dragoman of the Porte.
But I have reason to believe that the other interpretation which is attributed to this
paragraph, is much nearer the truth.)…
FO 78/98, ff. 154-57, 10 May 1821 (No. 30)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Turks’ fanatical spirit; the public execution of
Greek subjects, including the beheading of the ex-patriarch and twenty-three Greek
merchants in Adrianople; the destruction of Greek churches; and intelligence from
Odessa.]
…I have the honour to enclose a translation of the hatti-sherif [imperial edict of
the sultan] read at the Porte on the occasion of the deposition of Benderli Ali Pasha,
and the instalment of his successor in the office of grand vizier.
The views developed in this document are of a very alarming nature, and they
clearly prove the disposition of the Porte to give to the present unhappy state of
things in this country, the character of a conflict between the Christian and
Mahometan religions.
A more direct appeal to the fanaticism of the people, is contained in the
accompanying translation of an imperial order just addressed to the janissary aga.
The ostensible object of this order is the restoration of public tranquillity – but its
real results will be found in the prolongation of that system of sanguinary
persecution which now disgraces the councils of this Empire.
Public executions among the Greeks are still of daily occurrence. Five of their
churches have been plundered and destroyed by the janissaries, and there is but too
much reason to apprehend that these excesses were not committed without the
permission of the government.
I have accounts from Adrianople as late as the 3rd instant. On that day (in
consequence of a firman [imperial decree or order] from the Porte), the ex-patriarch
of the Greek Church shared the fate of the Patriarch Gregory, and was hanged at the
window of his metropolitan residence. On the 29th of April, twenty-three rich and
respectable Greek merchants were beheaded; not in virtue of orders from
Constantinople, but because such was the pleasure of the janissaries. The mullah
[chief Islamic judge] vainly attempted to stop this barbarous proceeding, and his

Mourousi’s “wife and children were placed under the surveillance of the patriarch, who was
held responsible for their safe custody: they escaped, however, to Odessa; and this was one of
the alleged causes of the melancholy catastrophe which followed. The irritation of the Turks
was now raised to the highest pitch of exasperation. The public and brutal execution of ten of
the principal Greeks of the Phanar, with various others of inferior note, seemed to whet the
appetite for blood among the Turkish populace, as similar scenes did that of the populace of
Paris.” Also see Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 71-72, 85-86, 91, 212-13, on the execution
of grand dragoman Constantine Mourousi (Kostaki Muruzi).
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own life was exposed to the utmost danger, in the course of his humane exertions to
save the unfortunate victims…
I take this opportunity of sending a copy of the last report which I have received
from Consul [James] Yeames [in Odessa]. It contains the surprizing, and (but for the
general accuracy of Mr. Yeames’s official statements) almost incredible intelligence
that the emperor of Russia has directed the governor of Odessa to give his protection
to the Greek refugees from Constantinople…37
FO 78/98, ff. 168-71a, 10 May 1821 (No. 31)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: details of the Russian ambassador’s conference
with the reis efendi (foreign minister) on several matters, including the Porte’s
systematic oppression of the Greek faith.]
…Baron de Stroganoff [Stroganov, Russian envoy] had a conference with the
reis efendi on Monday last, the 7th instant. He informs me that there were [several]
points under discussion.
1. The alarming character of the proceedings adopted by the Porte towards its
reaya, in their quality of members of the Greek religion – the destruction of several
Greek churches – and the public execution of the ministers of that faith, both at
Constantinople and elsewhere.
2. The state of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia…
On the first of these subjects, Baron de Stroganoff made the strongest and most
energetic representations, grounding them principally on the VII and XIV Articles of
the [Kutchuk-Kainardji] Treaty of 177438 (of which I have the honour to enclose an
37 Strangford received reports from James Yeames, British consul-general in Odessa, about the
situation in this strategically placed port, in particular the reactions of local authorities and
Greeks to the uprising and the impact of the upheaval on Russian-Ottoman relations. The
Yeames files, while not always reliable or accurate on tsarist policy in the Near East, kindled
British concern about the degree of official Russian involvement in the Greek sedition. Some of
Yeames’s dispatches to Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, from May to August 1821, are located
in TNA, FO 65/130. Also see George Jewsbury, “The Greek Question: The View from Odessa,
1815-1822,” Cahiers du monde russe 40, no. 4 (1999): 751-62. After the Ypsilanti debacle,
many Orthodox Christians fled Constantinople and the Danubian Principalities to escape
punishment. Seeking haven in Russia, these refugees included not just defeated insurgents but
uprooted non-combatants, such as Phanariotes, clergymen, merchants, craftsmen, shopkeepers,
sailors, and manual workers. Their numbers reached more than forty thousand in Bessarabia
alone by September 1821, after which Ottoman patrols sealed the border to prevent migration to
Russia and Austria; by the middle of 1822, nearly sixty thousand had flocked to both Odessa
and Bessarabia. Religious and humanitarian concerns prompted the tsarist government to
organize a vast relief drive to provide assistance, shelter, and employment. On these relief
efforts, see Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, 55-83, 192-201.
38 Articles 7 and 14 of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji called for the Sublime Porte to protect the
Christian faith and its churches in the Ottoman Empire and allowed Russia’s ambassador “to
make, upon all occasions, representations” on behalf of a Greek Orthodox church to be built in
the Galata quarter of Constantinople and the clergy at this new house of worship. See Hurewitz,
ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, 95-96.
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extract), which treaty certainly does give the Russian minister a distinct right to
interfere in questions affecting the security of the Greek ecclesiastical establishment
in this country.
I find that Baron de Stroganoff was so little satisfied with the explanations which
he received on this matter, that on the following day he renewed his complaints in
the form of an official note to the Porte...
FO 78/98, ff. 226-31a, 25 May 1821 (No. 40)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: accounts from the Morea, Epirus, and the
Cyclades.]
…A small body of troops under the command of Yussuf Pasha (and not
exceeding eight hundred men) has completely routed a corps of six thousand Greeks
in the Morea. The latter took to flight, with all the alacrity of modern patriots. They
had at their head the archbishop of Kalamata [a port in the southern Morea], and, I
am sorry to say, Messrs. Vlassopulo and Strani, the Russian and Prussian consuls.
These gentlemen have prudently retired to Zante [or Zakynthos, one of the Ionian
Islands]. Prevesa [a town in the Epirus region of northwestern Greece] has been
retaken. These events took place on the 6th instant. The slaughter of the Greeks both
before and after the battle (if it may be so termed) was prodigious, and several
baskets of ears and tongues have been exhibited at the Porte…
Two English gentlemen [who] just arrived here, were witnesses to a barbarous
massacre of the Turks in the island of Zea [one of the Cyclades], on Wednesday the
2nd instant.
The insurgents have taken possession of Tinos [in the Cyclades], and have
attempted to consecrate their revolution by religious processions and ceremonies
without end, and by the murder of many defenceless Turks.39 The Turkish
authorities in that island had taken refuge in the house of Mr. [Antonio] Vitali, the
English vice-consul; whose letters to me are of the 8th of May…
FO 78/98, ff. 239-43a, 25 May 1821 (No. 41)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the discussions of a recent council of state; the
Porte’s request for unity among all Muslim subjects; and the plea from the new
ecumenical patriarch, Eugenius II, for Ottoman clemency toward Greek Christian
subjects.40]
…On the 19th, a grand council was held at the Porte, and I have received from an
authentic source some account of its deliberations.
39 For information on Tinos during the War of Independence, in particular the island’s clan
rivalries and local factions, see Mark Mazower, “Villagers, Notables, and Imperial Collapse:
The Virgin Mary on Tinos in the 1820s,” in Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in
Honor of John Campbell, ed. Mazower, 69-87. Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, 1:
350, on sectarian tension between Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox islanders.
40 On Patriarch Eugenius II, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 33-35,
38-39, 41, 44, 52-53.
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[One of the] subjects…discussed…was the necessity of inculcating the principle
of a strict and general union, during the present crisis, among all classes and
departments of Mahometan believers. This was agreed upon, and letters of
admonition and exhortation were ordered to be written to the different pashas,
regencies, and other Ottoman authorities throughout the Empire…
Previously to the transaction of other business at the council of the 19th instant,
the patriarch was sent for by the kiahya bey [minister of the interior], who, in
presence of the reis efendi, put several questions to him; to which, it is said, that the
new prelate answered in so proper a manner, as to have made the greatest impression
on those ministers.
The patriarch presented yesterday to the Porte, a solemn memorial, drawn up in
the Turkish language; craving the sultan’s clemency towards his religion and
countrymen – making a tender of their repentance for the past, and of their
unbounded fidelity and allegiance for the future, and ending with these remarkable
expressions – “All that has happened is not to be attributed solely to the miserable
and prostrate Greek nation. It is the work of those who have contrived and set
them upon plans which have ended in their ruin.”…
FO 78/99, ff. 1-4a, 12 June 1821 (No. 44)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the state of relations between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire.]
…On the 3rd instant, the Russian envoy presented two notes to the Porte,
conceived in language of no ordinary vehemence.
As these notes were confidentially shewn to my first interpreter, by the
dragoman of the Porte, the former had an opportunity of making the extracts which I
have the honour to enclose.
In the first of them, M. de Stroganoff protests against the military proceedings of
the Turkish troops in the revolted Principalities, and prescribes the conduct which
(in the opinion of Russia) the Porte is bound to follow with respect to those
provinces. The baron then takes occasion to animadvert on the cruelties and
oppression (said to be) exercised by the Turkish pasha of Braila [a Danubian port in
eastern Wallachia], and recommends that the insurgents, who are suffering under
them, may be permitted to retire, either into Transylvania, or beyond the Pruth – in
other words, into the Austrian or Russian territory – a proposal, certainly much at
variance with the assurances given by the two emperors, that their dominions should
not serve as an asylum to the rebels.
(With respect to the complaints made by M. de Stroganoff, of the cruelties
practised by the pasha, I must, in fairness to the Porte, beg leave to mention that
some days ago, the reis efendi informed me that the Turkish troops were everywhere
hailed as deliverers – that so far from any unlawful violence having been permitted
or encouraged, a Turkish officer of high rank had been put to death, for having
plundered the house of a Wallachian farmer – and that the only acts of severity
which had occurred, had been at Galatz, in retaliation of the barbarous and
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indiscriminate massacre of the Turkish inhabitants, which took place there at the
beginning of the insurrection.)
M. de Stroganoff’s second note was meant to convey the answer of the emperor
to a demand of the Porte, made directly to the imperial cabinet, in March last,
touching the delivering up to the Turkish authorities of the fugitive rebels.
To this demand, M. de Stroganoff was not only instructed to reply in the
negative – but also to proclaim the intention of the emperor to grant an asylum to
every Christian, flying from Turkish oppression, who shall seek it within his
dominions.
M. de Stroganoff, after proceeding to assume as a fact that the present contest is
one of religion, and that this government is resolved “de frapper de mort et
d’extermination tout ce qui porte le nom de Chrétien en Turquie” [“to strike dead
and exterminate anyone who bears a Christian name in Turkey”], concludes by
stating that he has received the emperor’s commands to withdraw on board either of
a Russian public vessel, or of a merchant ship, accompanied by his legation, and by
all the Russian subjects remaining here, as soon as he should judge that the state of
matters imposed that necessity upon him.
I fear that the tone and language of these notes, and above all, the unqualified
manner in which the Porte is accused of being actuated by a spirit of sanguinary
persecution, joined to the unexpected resolution proclaimed by the emperor, of
permitting the rebels to take refuge in his states, will have an effect very opposite to
that of re-establishing its relations with M. de Stroganoff, on a footing of amity and
confidence…
FO 78/99, ff. 20-25a, 12 June 1821 (No. 46)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the tense relationship between the Ottoman
Empire and Russia.]
…[Austria’s internuncio Rudolf von Lützow] shewed me a dispatch from Prince
Metternich, which ordered him to demand an audience of the reis efendi, for the
purpose of representing to him that the true interests of the Porte required a different
mode of proceeding with respect to the reaya – that it was unwise and impolitic to
exercise an indiscriminate and sanguinary system of proscription, “envers
l’innocente population grecque” [“towards the innocent Greek population”] – that
the execution of the patriarch, or more properly the circumstances attending it, had
excited the utmost horror and alarm throughout Christendom – and that it was
considered as a declaration of hostility against Christianity in general, combined as it
was, with the emanation from the Porte, of various proclamations, bearing a
decidedly anti-Christian character. The dispatch concluded with a recommendation
to the internuncio, to obtain the support of his colleagues to the representations
which he was thus instructed to make.
I told the internuncio that I looked upon the unhappy dispute between the Porte
and the Russian envoy, as involving in its possible consequences the peace of all
Europe – that, under that impression, I should consider it to be my duty to leave no
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effort untried to bring the Porte to reason, and to engage her to assume a moderate
and conciliatory tone – but that my direct interference could go no further, unless
specifically authorized by my court – that while I deplored the severities to which
the Ottoman government had been obliged to have recourse, I could not but recollect
that they had been the consequence and the punishment of an extensive and
systematic rebellion – that, under that conviction, I could not admit the propriety of
advocating the “innocence of the Greeks” – nor could I believe that I was entitled
to dictate to an independent government, the mode and the degree of the
chastisement which it chose to inflict upon the authors of an insurrection, that
menaced the very existence of that government – that while I lamented the rigorous
course pursued by the Porte, I could hardly be surprized at it, since every day
brought fresh accounts of the horrid and atrocious cruelties perpetrated by the rebels
– and lastly, that with regard to the patriarch, he (the internuncio) knew as well as
myself that the Porte had offered to put into our hands incontestable proofs of that
prelate’s guilt (consisting of his original letters to the clergy in the Morea) – and that
we had abstained from availing ourselves of that offer, because we did not wish to
associate ourselves, in any way, with a matter solely and exclusively concerning the
Porte – that, in my opinion, nothing had since occurred which ought to induce us to
change that view of the case – and therefore that I should still consider myself as
bound to refrain from all allusion to it – unless the Turkish minister should, in the
proposed conference, invite me to do so…
FO 78/99, ff. 30-42, 12 June 1821 (No. 47)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: his recent conference with the reis efendi on a
variety of issues, in particular the execution of the patriarch.]
…The affair of the patriarch then naturally came to be mentioned, and on my
expressing an apprehension that the circumstances of that transaction might occasion
the Porte to be accused, in foreign courts, of a disposition unfriendly to the Christian
religion, the reis efendi repelled this idea with considerable energy, and said that the
fact of the execution having taken place on Easter Sunday, was an accident, and not
by any means, a designed insult to that solemn festival – that the question of the
patriarch’s guilt had only been determined on the preceding day – but that the nature
of his punishment had not then been decided on – that in the interval, a fresh mass of
the most convincing evidence against him, had been submitted to the sultan, who, in
a fit of violent anger and indignation, had ordered his instant execution – that the
Greeks who had massacred the Turks at Galatz, had indeed chosen Friday for the
commission of that atrocious act, but that it would have been utterly beneath the
dignity of the Sublime Porte, to have imitated them in such an unworthy mode of
insulting religion – that the present contest was not of a religious character, for that
the Porte had never been biassed by any consideration of the faith of the individuals
whom she was occasionally called upon either to condemn or to spare – citing, in
proof of the first of these assertions, the recent execution of several Mussulmans,
and amongst them, one of a very distinguished rank among the teachers of that
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religion – and in support of the second, the prompt and ready attention shewn by the
Porte to my demands in behalf of the Christians at Smyrna and elsewhere, and, more
recently, in favor of the inhabitants of Milos [an island in the Cyclades]…
FO 78/99, ff. 100-04a, 26 June 1821 (No. 57)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the massacre of Aivali’s Greek inhabitants,
occasioned by their own perfidy and cruelty.]
…Some time ago, an insurrection broke out at Aivali [Kydonies; modern-day
Ayvalik], a large and flourishing city of Asia Minor, principally inhabited by
Greeks, whose numbers are stated to amount to twenty thousand.41
Osman Pasha had received orders (as I was informed by Mr. Consul Werry) to
put the whole of this population to the sword.42 But the pasha contented himself with
the submission of the inhabitants, and deferred the execution of his orders, untill he
should receive fresh instructions from Constantinople, for which purpose he
dispatched one of his principal officers.
On receiving this information, I thought that it would be highly proper to make
some efforts in behalf of these unfortunate people – and I gave instructions
accordingly to my interpreter to introduce the subject at his next conference with the
reis efendi.
I have the honour to enclose a copy of M. Chabert’s report, from which Your
Lordship will perceive that the reis efendi strongly denied the existence of the
sanguinary orders said to have been transmitted to Osman Pasha, declaring that such
instructions would have been equally repugnant to the principles of humanity
inculcated by the Koran, and to the personal feelings of the Ottoman government.43
41 On the massacre at Aivali (Kydonies), see Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, 1: 221-23;
St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free, 5.
42 Francis Werry, Britain’s consul in Smyrna from 1793 to 1829, became one of Strangford’s
regular sources of information. On the life and diplomatic career of Werry, see Prousis, British
Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant, 143-80; Richard Clogg, “Smyrna in 1821:
Documents from the Levant Company Archives in the Public Record Office,” Mikrasiatika
Chronika 15 (1972): 313-71; Tom Rees, Merchant Adventurers in the Levant: Two British
Families of Privateers, Consuls, and Traders, 1700-1956 (Stawell, Somerset, UK: Talbot,
2003), 1-57.
43 François (Francis) Chabert, dragoman at the British embassy for over three decades, belonged
to one of the Levantine dragoman dynasties that served the Porte and various European states
over the centuries, including the French, British, and Sardinian embassies. Strangford’s letters
to the London Foreign Office made frequent reference to Chabert as well as to dragomans from
the Pisani, Fonton, and Franchini families. See Alexander H. de Groot, “Dragomans’ Careers:
The Change of Status in Some Families Connected with the British and Dutch Embassies at
Istanbul, 1785-1829,” in Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in
the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century, eds. Alastair Hamilton,
Alexander H. de Groot, and Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 225-26, 235-46,
on the Chabert, Pisani, Fonton, and Franchini families. They formed part of a well-connected
cosmopolitan network of Levantine middlemen interrelated by marriage, service experience,
and residence in Pera and Galata, the areas in Constantinople that housed most of the capital’s
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It was therefore with as much surprize as concern that I learned from the reis
efendi on Saturday last that the whole of the male population of Aivali had been
massacred, and that the women and children had been sent into slavery.
The reis efendi (who undoubtedly thought that after his former assurances, some
explanation was due to me) justified this proceeding, by stating that Osman Pasha,
having accepted the submission of the Aivaliotes, carried his indulgence so far as to
permit them to retain their arms – that matters remained perfectly tranquil in the
town, till the sudden appearance in the offing, of a large squadron of the Greek
insurgents, induced the inhabitants to hope that it had come to their succour, and that
they might make another attempt at revolt with better success. They accordingly rose
en masse, and butchered about fifteen hundred Turks. But the squadron (the
appearance of which in the bay had been merely accidental) having in the meantime
sailed away, the Turks recovered their courage, and an indiscriminate massacre of
the Greeks was the just though dreadful reward of their perfidy.
Mr. Consul Werry confirms the reis efendi’s account of this transaction…
FO 78/99, ff. 218-28, 23 July 1821 (No. 71)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British envoy’s observations on the Russian
official note, with an eight-day deadline, submitted to the Porte by Stroganov.]
…It will not escape Your Lordship’s observation that the Russian note may
properly be divided into three subjects of discussion…
With respect to the first, I cannot conceal the deep and serious apprehensions
which I entertain, that the Porte may be disposed to reject with haughtiness and
indignation the assertion put forward by Russia – that the co-existence of Turkey
with the other states of Europe has hitherto been endured solely under the tacit
convention that she should treat her Christian subjects with indulgence – that Russia
was to be the judge of the degree and quality of that indulgence, and that upon her
feeling herself dissatisfied with the conduct of Turkey towards the Greeks, she had a
right, on proclaiming her dissatisfaction, to array against the Turkish Empire the
united force of all Christendom, and to declare its existence to be incompatible with
the stability and security of the Christian faith.
I cannot enter into any consideration of the second branch into which the Russian
note may be divided, without expressing my unfeigned concern at the exaggerated
European consulates, embassies, and merchant firms. For more on the careers and activities of
dragomans in the Ottoman world, see Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul, 215-18; Maurits H. van
den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beratlis in
the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 64-70; Cunningham, Eastern Questions, 1-22; Bernard
Lewis, “From Babel to Dragomans,” in From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East,
ed. Bernard Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press), 18-32. On the dragoman section of the
British embassy, see in particular Geoff R. Berridge, “English Dragomans and Oriental
Secretaries: The Early Nineteenth Century Origins of the Anglicization of the British Embassy
Drogmanat in Constantinople,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 4 (2003): 137-52; idem,
British Diplomacy in Turkey, 49-64.
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statements which have gone abroad, and which have been copied into all the public
journals in Europe respecting the conduct of the Porte towards its insurgent subjects.
The scope of these statements is to shew that Turkey is resolved, not to subjugate the
Greeks as rebels, but to exterminate them as Christians – and thus to give to the
present contest, the character of a war of religion.44
I owe it to truth to record my entire dissent from these accusations.
The Greek subjects of the Porte are everywhere in rebellion against their
sovereign. These rebels are Christians – and the punishment which is inflicted upon
them, is imposed in the former, and not in the latter of these characters. There have,
elsewhere, been instances of revolts conducted by subjects of a different faith from
that generally established in the country; but it was never thought that in
endeavouring to suppress rebellion, it was the intention of the lawful government to
wage a war of proscription against the religion of the rebels. It happened, forty years
ago, in the first and finest country in the world, that a frantic and lawless mob
pillaged or destroyed the chapels of a religion different from that of the state, and
that those disorders continued during several days, until at length repressed by the
energy of the government.45 In the same manner, the outrages committed by the
populace against some Greek chapels in Constantinople, were the work of a furious
and fanatic multitude. They were publicly disavowed by the government, who has,
since, taken every measure likely to prevent the recurrence of such disgraceful
excesses. It is a fact that since the first moment of general popular indignation,
occasioned by the discovery of the Greek conspiracy, not one of the churches
belonging to that religion has been destroyed or injured – that the Greeks do upon all
occasions resort to them as freely as heretofore – that the new patriarch has received
a firman, permitting him to rebuild or repair those which had suffered from the fury
of the janissaries; and that out of a number of seventy-six churches and chapels, in
44 Press coverage in Europe resonated with a decidedly pro-Greek slant, fully reflecting
admiration of classical antiquity and sympathy for fellow Christians. See St. Clair, That Greece
Might Still Be Free, 51-65; Jean Dimakis, La guerre de l’indépendance grecque vue par la
presse française (période de 1821 à 1824) (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968);
idem, La presse française face à la chute de Missolonghi et à la bataille navale de Navarin
(Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976); Aristide Dimopoulos, L’opinion publique
française et la révolution grecque (Nancy: V. Idoux, 1962).
45 Strangford expressed a distinct sense of British nationalism when he praised England as “the
first and finest country in the world.” He also alluded to the Gordon Riots of 1780 in London.
Lord George Gordon (1751-93) galvanized an anti-Catholic uprising against the parliamentary
act of 1778 that sought to eliminate some of the penalties and restrictions against Roman
Catholics in England. Gordon incited Protestant zealots with fears of papism and royal
absolutism, and the subsequent Gordon Riots featured not just marches and petitions but attacks
against Catholic churches and chapels. When violence spread to the Bank of England, the army
suppressed the unrest and restored order. For Strangford, this episode of public lawlessness and
mob mayhem appeared relevant in grasping the sectarian-induced aggression in Constantinople.
On the Gordon Riots, see Nicholas Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 152-75; Christopher Hibbert, King Mob: The Story of Lord
George Gordon and the Riots of 1780 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1958).
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the city and neighbourhood of Constantinople, but one was utterly destroyed, and
only thirteen were plundered or otherwise injured by the mob.
(The enclosed paper, confirming this statement, was communicated to me by a
Greek priest of high respectability – who certainly will not be suspected of being
inclined to palliate the conduct of the Turks.)
The execution of the patriarch was an act, the severity and the circumstances of
which it is impossible sufficiently to deplore. But I feel myself bound in conscience
and in honour to declare my positive conviction, founded on grounds of evidence
which cannot be suspected, that not only that unfortunate prelate, but many, if not all
the bishops who shared his fate, were deeply involved in a conspiracy, of which the
Greek clergy were the principal agents and promoters.
But a positive demonstration that in punishing these personages with death, the
Porte was actuated by no feeling hostile to their religion, is found in the fact that
every one of the sees thus rendered vacant, was instantly filled up, and with a
scrupulous regard to the rites and usages of the Greek Church.
Under these impressions, and with the knowledge of these facts, I cannot admit
the justice of those parts of the Russian note, which represent the Porte to be
actuated by a spirit of sanguinary persecution – which confound the past excesses of
the populace with the present sentiments and intentions of the government – which
give no credit to the latter for that better order of things which its exertions have at
length produced – (exertions of which the enclosed document, containing the
substance of the firmans lately promulgated, is a satisfactory proof) – and which
proclaim that because the rebel Greeks profess the same faith as Russia, the
punishment of their treason is to be considered as a signal of hostility against
Christendom in general, and as giving to all the powers of Europe the right to make
common cause for the annihilation of the Turkish Empire.
The third division of the Russian note contains the demands on which M. de
Stroganoff has orders to insist.
If the terms in which these demands are conveyed, do not produce an
unfavourable impression, I hardly think that the Porte could or would refuse to
accede to the greater part of them. The rebuilding of the demolished chapels, has
already been permitted to the patriarch, and the principle once recognized, it does
not seem very difficult for the government to carry it a little further, and to consent
to reconstruct or repair those edifices at its own expence. The demand for the
security of the Greek religion is answered by the fact that its rites are regularly
performed, and numerously attended by the Greek population of this capital and its
environs. The satisfaction required for the death of the patriarch, might be given, by
a full and fair disclosure of the evidence on which he was condemned. And the
assurance that the government will take every precaution to distinguish the innocent
from the guilty, is an act of such positive justice, and is, moreover, so strictly in
conformity to the various firmans and hatti-sherifs lately issued by the Porte, that I
cannot imagine that a mere feeling of resentment for the imperious manner in which
this requisition is made, ought to prevent the Turkish ministers from admitting it…

200

TH. C. PROUSIS

I feel that I should be guilty of the greatest impropriety if I were to obtrude upon
Your Lordship any opinion of my own, respecting the probable intentions of Russia
in making these representations in a manner so little calculated to conciliate the
haughty spirit of the Ottoman government. But it is my duty to advert to the belief
which is gone forth in these countries, that, in fact, conciliation is not the present
policy of Russia – that in precipitating a war, of which the results cannot be
doubtful, and of which the ostensible cause is the maintenance of the Greek Church,
she averts the destruction of that influence which she has so long been labouring to
create in Greece – that in proclaiming herself the defender of their religion, she
indemnifies the Greeks for the disapprobation and discouragement which, regard for
public faith and respect for public opinion, obliged her to manifest at the beginning
of their rebellion – and that she confidently hopes to place herself by the events of
the war, in such a position, as will enable her to extend over the whole Greek nation,
that authority and that protection which treaties (the result of similar wars) have
given her a right to exercise in Wallachia and Moldavia…
[Strangford enclosed this document (FO 78/99, ff. 250-51), a translation of a
brief summary of damages to Greek churches in Constantinople as of May 1821.]
In the city of Constantinople, there are twenty-four Greek churches or chapels,
seven of which were forcibly entered by the mob and received considerable damage.
The images were cut to pieces, and some silver lamps carried away.
In the towns and villages forming the suburbs of the city, there are nearly forty
churches, sanctioned by the government, and eleven more in the Princes’ Islands.
Of this number, only one church has been entirely destroyed. Six more were
injured, in the same manner as those in the city. The buildings are, however, left
entire.
The janissaries attempted to force their way into the patriarchal church, but were
prevented – and it remains uninjured.
The residence of the patriarch near the church was pillaged of goods, and of
money deposited there by the Turkish government for the Serbian deputies.46 The
total loss may be estimated at one hundred thousand piastres.

46 After the outbreak of the Greek rebellion, the Porte broke off talks with Serbian delegates and
ordered their transfer from the patriarchal residence to the sultan’s palace for safekeeping.
Serbian deputies, representing the semi-autonomous tributary pashalik of Serbia, arrived in
Constantinople in 1820 to negotiate several contested points with the Porte, such as Serbia’s
tribute payment, territorial boundaries, and administrative jurisdiction. The delegation hoped to
win piecemeal concessions that would elevate Serbia to full autonomy. Russia’s embassy
participated in these discussions, with Stroganov pressing the Porte to comply with its promise
in Article 8 of the Treaty of Bucharest and advising the deputies how to proceed with their
deliberations. With Greek and Danubian matters now taking precedence in Russian-Ottoman
exchanges, and with Stroganov’s departure from the capital in August 1821, the Porte ceased
negotiations with the Serbian delegates and demanded their confinement. See Michael Boro
Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1976), 1: 103-08, 120-22.
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Permission has been given, by a firman, to the new patriarch, to rebuild and
repair the churches that have been injured. But he thinks it prudent to suspend, for
the present, taking advantage of it.
FO 78/99, ff. 276-86a, 26 July 1821 (No. 76)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: details of the British envoy’s discussion with the
reis efendi on the strained relationship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.]
…Having long been desirous to confer with the reis efendi on various matters
which are under discussion between this embassy and the Porte, I was summoned
yesterday to attend His Excellency at his countryseat on the Bosporus.
After terminating most of these matters in a satisfactory way, the reis efendi
proceeded to a full and fair consideration of the present question with Russia.
He began by thanking me for the friendly part which I had taken during the
progress of these transactions; with the expression, however, of much concern
that the moderation and forbearance which I had so earnestly and so constantly
recommended to the Porte, had been completely misunderstood by the Russian
government, and had drawn down upon that of Turkey, insults and affronts to
which no independent nation could submit: That it would be better for the sultan
to perish in the ruins of the Seraglio [the imperial palace of the sultans], than to be
told that he held his existence among the sovereigns of Europe, solely at the will and
pleasure of the emperor of Russia, and that all Christendom was to engage in a
common armament against him, because an unprovoked rebellion had placed him
under the necessity of punishing some individuals, who happened to be of the same
faith as the Emperor Alexander [I]. And here, said the reis efendi, I ask of you,
English ambassador, does your government proclaim these principles? And is credit
to be given to the assertion of Russia, that she acts with the consent and approbation
of all other powers (including, of course, Great Britain), when she declares that the
Porte, by punishing her rebel subjects, renders it impossible for Christian states to
hold further intercourse with her? If so, and if your government has really associated
itself to this league against us, we can only say that it is not a very just reward for
the attention with which we have listened to the advice of its ambassador, and for
the multiplied proofs of patience, which in consequence of that advice, we have not
ceased to give, since the day when the Russian minister virtually declared war
against us, by stopping at once, and without provocation, his official relations with
the Porte.
We are almost weary of repeating that we have been obliged, in consequence of
a most extensive conspiracy (the origin and the abettors of which we well know),
to punish with severity some traitors of distinguished rank in the Greek Church, and
that we did so, in their quality of rebels, and not in that of Christians – that we defy
the Russian minister to cite an example of Catholics, Protestants, or Armenians,
having been exposed to persecution – that even the Greeks themselves, exercise
freely and fully, all the duties of their religion, to which the Porte has never opposed
the slightest impediment. We are told, continued the reis efendi, that the hatti-sherifs
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issued by the Porte, bore a decidedly anti-Christian character – We are sorry that
they should be so misunderstood. At a moment of the most imminent peril, we had
recourse to the measures which had saved the Empire on similar occasions. A
rebellion was proclaimed, the result of which, if successful, would have been the
destruction of the Moslem faith. This object was avowed in all the proclamations of
the rebels. As Mussulmans, we could not, in our counter-proclamations, pass over in
utter silence, the fact that our religion was in danger. We did not hesitate to avow it.
With us, the religion and the state are identified, and the experience of ages has
taught us, that to save the one, we must appeal to the other. But, in making this
appeal, we do most solemnly declare that we had never the intention, falsely
imputed to us, of exciting a general persecution against those who differed from us
in religious opinions. Such a proceeding would have been contrary to the letter and
the spirit of our holy law.
The pretence therefore of religion, is merely an excuse, which the ingenuity of
ambition has invented, to mask the injustice of the most unprovoked aggression
(should Russia really seek for war) that has ever occurred. I remember, said the reis
efendi, when all Europe complained of Napoleon Bonaparte, but I do protest that no
war was ever undertaken by him, less justifiable than that with which we are now
menaced. He, too, knew how to proclaim grand and specious principles – and the
liberty of the seas, and the tyranny of the English, were to him, what the liberty of
religion and the tyranny of the Turks, are now, to the Emperor Alexander [I].
What would Europe think of us, if we were to say to Russia [?] “The Greeks,
who profess the same faith as you do, have destroyed (as is the fact) many of our
mosques – have murdered our clergy, with the most dreadful tortures – have violated
their wives, and abused their children – and unless you rebuild these mosques and
make reparations for these insults in eight days, we will declare that your existence
is incompatible with the safety of our religion – we will make war upon you – and
we will call upon all the Mussulman states in the world, to make common cause
with us against you.”
Having thus, added the Turkish minister, shewn the justice of our position, it
only remains for me to assure you that nothing shall induce us to relinquish it. Our
answer to the Russian envoy cannot possibly be prepared within the time which he
has prescribed – we shall therefore, tomorrow, request a delay of two or three days –
we shall give to his dragoman a summary notion of what the answer will contain –
and you may rely upon it, that we shall follow your advice, and carry moderation,
forbearance, and conciliation to the utmost extent, consistent with our dignity and
with the safety of the Empire…
FO 78/99, ff. 306-12a, 30 July 1821 (No. 79)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the state of negotiations between the Ottoman
Empire and Russia.]
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…On Thursday morning, the two Russian dragomans (Franchini) proceeded to
the Porte to demand an answer to Baron de Stroganoff’s note; the term allowed by
that minister having expired.
The reis efendi told them that it had been found impossible to prepare the
answer, alledging the shortness of the time – the importance of the considerations
which were involved in the answer – the indispensible necessity of consulting every
individual in the Divan – and the time occupied by the translation of the baron’s
note, which had consumed nearly four, out of the allotted eight days.
The Russian dragomans said that they would report this request to the baron, but
demanded, in the meantime, a previous explanation of the nature of the answer,
which, when ready, the Russian minister was to receive.
To this, the reis efendi replied by stating (according to the report of the
conversation which he gave to my dragoman, and which the latter delivered to me in
writing): 1. that the Porte solemnly and explicitly disavowed the intention of
persecuting the Greeks on account of their religion or of waging a war of
extermination against them as Christians; 2. that the patriarch had been punished for
his treasons only, and not as chief of a religion different from that of the state – and
that the indignities offered to his corpse were the consequence of the wild and
ungovernable fanaticism of the multitude, and not that of the orders of government;
3. that as soon as quiet was re-established, permission would be given to repair the
churches and chapels which had suffered from the fury of the mob; 4. that the Porte
ever had, and ever would endeavour to distinguish the innocent from the guilty,
lamenting that any case should ever have occurred, without its knowledge or
consent, in which they had been confounded – a circumstance which was not the
result of a system, but was one of the unhappy and too common accidents of civil
war; and 5. that as soon as the Principalities were completely disengaged from the
rebels, and that the fate of Ypsilanti and his adherents had been determined, the
Turkish troops (whose presence had been invited by the Russian envoy himself)
should be withdrawn – the hospodars re-established – and everything placed on a
footing conformable to treaties…
FO 78/100, ff. 119-21, 18 August 1821 (No. 93)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the firmans issued by the Porte, proclaiming a
more mild and merciful conduct toward the insurgents, and an imperial letter to the
ecumenical patriarch.]
…The reis efendi’s letter contained a copy of the imperial firmans which have
just been sent to all the provinces of European and Asiatic Turkey…
Although these firmans do not go so far as absolutely to proclaim an amnesty to
such Greeks as shall surrender within a given time (which was the main object of my
note), the principle of humanity which they avow, and the disposition to recur to a
more mild and merciful system, which they express, have been received with the
liveliest satisfaction by my colleagues and by me.
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My success has certainly not been so complete as I wished. But enough has been
done to prove the inclination of this government to listen to good advice – and to
adopt, in consequence of it, such moderate measures towards its insurgent subjects,
as cannot fail of being acceptable to the allied courts. The consoling change of
system encourages me in the hope that it may still be found possible to lead the
Porte a little further, and to procure a greater extension to the principles which it has
at last, been brought to acknowledge.
At the time when I presented my note, I instructed my dragoman to submit to the
reis efendi in a confidential manner, the expediency of issuing an imperial rescript to
the patriarch, inviting that prelate to give his assistance in recalling the Greeks to
their duty – and announcing such dispositions towards them and their religion, as
might have the effect of dissipating the universal alarm felt on that subject, by all the
Christian powers.
This overture was not, at first, very favourably received. Upon its being renewed,
the reis efendi proposed that a verbal communication should be made to the
patriarch; and to this idea he adhered, during several days; until at length, the
influence of the kiahya bey (which I had succeeded in securing) produced an
imperial letter to the patriarch, of which I have the pleasure to enclose a
translation…
FO 78/101, ff. 89-96, 17 September 1821 (No. 114)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the deliberations of European envoys at the Porte
on the matter of their proposed communication with insurgent Greeks, urging their
submission to the sultan’s authority.]
…It is clear that as long as the insurrection of the Greeks shall continue, the
severities which the Turks will think themselves warranted in exercising towards
them, will always give to Russia such grounds for complaint, as must continually
endanger the peaceable relations of the two countries – a state of things, to avert
which, the influence of the allied courts is now directed. Something must therefore
be done towards ending this insurrection. We have already engaged the Porte to
proclaim a pardon to her misguided subjects. We cannot hope that she will persevere
in holding out this offer, if the Greeks continue to reject it. A recurrence to the
dreadful system of sanguinary persecution which distinguished the first measures of
the Turkish government, would be the deplorable consequence; and with it, renewed
representations on the part of Russia. It is therefore requisite to induce the Greeks to
accept the offered clemency of the Porte, and the only plan which we could devise
for the purpose, is that to which we are about to have recourse. We believe that
sufficient care has been taken in our mode of proceeding, to guard on the one hand,
against everything like an engagement or promise, on the part of our courts, in case
the Greeks should submit and return to their obedience, and on the other, against the
slightest indication of menace in case they should not. We have confined ourselves
to giving them fair and friendly counsels – to shewing the advantages which would
arise from submission – and the danger to which a perseverance in rebellion
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(unsupported and unaided) would inevitably expose them. If, therefore, the intended
representation should fail of success, we venture to think that our courts are not in
any way committed by it, the point of dignity, involved by our holding
communication with rebels, being sufficiently saved by the circumstance of the
government to which we are accredited, having solicited that communication to be
made. If, however, a happier result should attend our proceedings, we shall have
acquired from the Porte by our accession to its request, a distinct and indisputable
right to exert ourselves openly in the cause of humanity – to prevent all recurrence to
sanguinary measures – and to watch with effectual vigilance over the scrupulous
fulfillment of these engagements, on the faith of which, the Greeks may have been
induced to submit…
FO 78/101, ff. 146-49a, 25 September 1821 (No. 121)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: assorted intelligence from Constantinople.]
…Many circumstances take place here, which can only be accounted for by the
apprehensions which the government entertains of the janissaries, and by the timid
policy which leads it to flatter the passions of that turbulent and powerful body.
In this class of occurrences may be placed the publication of another firman,
again calling upon the people to wear arms, and threatening punishment to those
who disobey the order.
The firman (which was issued at the close of a council held at the house of the
mufti [sheikh al-Islam]47 on the 18th instant) declares that though the Ottoman
Empire be surrounded with enemies on every side, there are no immediate
apprehensions of a foreign war – but that still, it is necessary for every person to be
prepared to meet that event, should it unfortunately happen; and that in the
meantime, it was the sultan’s positive orders that no person should presume to talk
about peace or war, or about the chances of either the one or the other, which are
matters of state, and only to be discussed by the supreme authorities.
The firman then proceeds to direct the imams [prayer leaders] to make lists of the
true Turkish population of Constantinople, it being ascertained that many
individuals appear in the Mussulman habit, without being entitled to wear it. This
operation has been commenced, and has also extended to the Greeks and Armenians,
who are now compelled to enroll their names, occupations, and places of abode, in
registers kept for that purpose…
An alarming fire broke out some nights ago, either at the Imperial Mint or in its
immediate neighbourhood. Many unfortunate (and I believe, innocent) Greeks who
were employed about the establishment, have been arrested on suspicion, and are
now in close confinement. I hope to be able to do something in their behalf.

47 The grand mufti or sheikh al-Islam, appointed by the sultan, served as the Empire’s foremost
legal authority on Islamic jurisprudence and headed the ulema, the hierarchy of Islamic
religious and legal scholars.
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On the 19th, fourteen heads were exhibited at the Seraglio, said to be those of
Persians taken by Dawood Pasha of Baghdad, in an incursion made by them…48
On Sunday last, a proclamation was read in the Armenian churches by order of
the patriarch of that religion, purporting to be issued under the authority of the
government. It requires all Armenians to separate themselves as much as possible
from the Greeks – to hire no servants belonging to that nation – to let no houses to
Greeks – and to refrain from improperly wearing the Frank dress, which had given
rise to great abuses. This proclamation, as far as the Greeks are concerned, appears
to be so needlessly severe, and so contrary to the moderate system which this
government has declared its intention of trying, that I shall certainly feel myself
warranted in making a friendly expostulation to the reis efendi upon the subject…
FO 78/102, ff. 143-54, 10 December 1821 (No. 166)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the conference between the British ambassador
and Ottoman government ministers on the subject of Russian-Ottoman negotiations.]
…At my interview with the reis efendi on Thursday last, there were present,
besides that minister, the grand judge of Rumelia, and Gianib Efendi, who was at the
head of the foreign department on my arrival in this country.
The conference, being private, was held at the reis efendi’s house in
Constantinople, where I arrived at eleven o’clock, and remained in conversation
with His Excellency and his colleagues untill three o’clock…
We then discussed the question of religious persecution, and of the repair of the
churches which had been damaged by the mob in April last. All the arguments
which the Porte had adduced on other occasions to prove the non-existence of the
former were again employed, and I must own to Your Lordship that I could not
avoid admitting that they were founded in fact. As to the second point, the Turkish
ministers asserted that they were ready to give permission to rebuild the three or four
churches that had been injured, whenever the Greek patriarch should request it, and
whenever the state of public feeling here should permit that indulgence to be openly
granted to the Greek nation. But that for the moment, the government could not,
without the risque of fresh disturbances, venture upon such a step.
I then suggested that an authentic document, explaining this point, would go far
towards relieving the Turkish character from the imputation of harbouring an
unfriendly disposition towards the Christian religion – and I proposed that a
bouyourouldi [official note or announcement] should be addressed by the Porte to
the Greek patriarch – disavowing the excesses of the mob in April last – admitting

48 Dawood Pasha, similar to Ali Pasha of Ioannina and Muhammad Ali of Egypt, exemplified the
devolution of Ottoman political power in the early nineteenth century. As pasha of Baghdad
from 1817 to 1831, he balanced opportunism with violence and generosity to maintain order in
his region. Dawood Pasha controlled various tribal groups, raised his own loyal forces, built
public works, and stopped the Persian attack of 1823. See Stephen H. Longrigg, “Dāwūd Pasha,”
Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition 2: 184.
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the right of the Greeks to the repair and re-establishment of their churches –
declaring that for the moment, it could not be effected – but that when a proper time
came, no impediment should be opposed to their reconstruction.
This, being an ecclesiastical or religious matter, was referred to the chief judge –
who told me that he saw no objection to my proposal, and that he would take upon
himself to recommend it to the favourable consideration of the Divan…
FO 78/106, ff. 141-52, 11 February 1822 (No. 21)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the request of Ecumenical Patriarch Eugenius II
that the British ambassador assist him in circulating, throughout the Archipelago and
Morea, a pastoral letter advising Greek insurgents to return to their allegiance to the
sultan.]
…The patriarch has sent a letter to my first interpreter, of which I have the
honour to enclose a translation. It was accompanied with eighteen manuscript copies
of a pastoral exhortation which the patriarch has addressed to his revolted
countrymen, signed by that prelate and by fourteen Greek bishops. A translation of
this document is also enclosed herewith.
The object of the patriarch’s application to M. Chabert was, to engage my
assistance in transmitting his letters to the various places in the Morea and
Archipelago to which they were addressed, by English vessels proceeding there
from Constantinople or Smyrna, as no Turkish ships would proceed to the ports
occupied by the insurgents.
I venture to hope that Your Lordship will not disapprove of my having acceded
to the patriarch’s wishes, by availing myself of every opportunity which has hitherto
occurred, for forwarding these letters to their several destinations. I persuade myself
that Your Lordship will be of [the] opinion that this measure is calculated to serve
the cause of peace and humanity, and that at the moment when the Turkish
government is collecting all its means to act decisively against the Morea, it would
be a deed of kindness towards its deluded inhabitants, to give them this last chance
of escaping the perils which menace them, by embracing the counsels and listening
to the remonstrances of their spiritual chief.
The patriarch informed M. Chabert (whom I sent to wait on him two or three
days ago) that this measure had taken place with the consent of the Porte, but that
the latter did not wish to appear in it, and was desirous that it should seem to
originate exclusively with the head of the Greek Church…
[Strangford attached this translation of a letter addressed to Mr. Chabert by the
ecumenical patriarch, dated January 19/31 1822 (FO 78/106, ff. 144-45).]
…After giving you our benediction and asking the state of your health, we have
to inform you that, pursuant to our paternal and ecclesiastical duty, we have
prepared circular letters for the Morea, and all the islands of the Archipelago,
directed to such of the inhabitants of the said places as profess the Greek religion.
We therein represent to them, on the part of God as well as on that of the human
race, that by their mad perseverance in revolt, they are losing their rights and
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sacrificing their happiness; and we exhort them to repentance. We paternally advise
and invite them to cast away without fear, the arms which are employed to their ruin,
to re-enter into their former and ancient condition of subjects, and to accept the
mercy and pardon His Imperial Majesty, our august sovereign, offers them.
It is important that our packets, containing those paternal exhortations which our
zeal suggested us to give them, and the assurances of the generosity and
magnanimity of His Imperial Majesty towards his subjects, should reach them
safely. But the only means we can employ to that purpose, is to beg His Excellency
the ambassador of His Britannic Majesty to be pleased to forward our letters to their
destination; he having the means of doing it with safety.
We wish therefore to know whether His Excellency will have the goodness to
comply with our request, and beg you will give us an answer for our satisfaction…
[Strangford enclosed this translation of a pastoral exhortation addressed by the
patriarch to Greek insurgents in the Morea and the islands (FO 78/106, ff. 146-52.]
…[Y]ou, inhabitants of the Morea and all the inhabitants of the islands of the
Archipelago, subjects of the sultan, ought to be more quiet and obedient, in a spirit
of submission and due subjection, and evince every proof of humility (as the divine
law directs), both as Christians and men, under the authority of political
administration and controul. But alas! Alas! By treading under foot, and destroying
every law, both divine and human; by casting off all evangelical and apostolical
duties, and exhibiting an ingratitude equal to that of the traitor Judas, you have
presumed to take up arms in your hands and to raise the standard of rebellion – and
even more, contrary to all the ordinances and injunctions of our Saviour, the celestial
king; roused by a lust and ambition quite diabolical, you have launched into revolt
and disobedience, such as the Devil inspired into the minds of our first parents in
Paradise – and in short, with the same insatiate fury and the same devilish desires –
whilst the Church of God was at peace and all was quiet – sorrow and grief have
come on the human race – and particularly on you yourselves, thus labouring to
attain misery on misery, present and future, and to clothe your innocent wives and
children in garments of mourning and lamentation…
Secure therefore, if you are true Christians, and if, indeed, you possess a drop of
Christianity in you, secure, I say, the pity, the kind philanthropy and generosity of
our most compassionate, just, and humane sovereign. Although His Highness, from
the first day that the accursed flame of rebellion burst forth, might have adopted
every act of violence and done deeds of the utmost cruelty, but, whereas his usual
habits are those of mercy and humanity, he has merely chastised, as he was bound to
do, those who were the heads of the revolution; and for those who remained tranquil
and neuter in their character of reaya, he has done everything to ensure safety and
repose; and doubly merciful and gracious is he to those who implore forgiveness for
the past – them he receives with all attention, promising them the certainty of their
lives in peace and security – the same as to us inhabitants of Constantinople and
other parts, where we enjoy the same religion and fruits of obedience, favoured by
his philanthropic protection, covered by the shade of his tree…
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But as a long time has elapsed, without our having seen or heard of, any step
towards amendment, such as we had hoped, we have determined to testify our
paternal solicitude; and influenced by our heartfelt grief and love to notify to you all
our ecclesiastical and paternal advice and evangelical admonitions, so that we may
not, through our silence, be guilty of any spiritual sin, by disregarding your spiritual
liberty and salvation.
Therefore, brother-Christians, and my sons, of our Church, you who live in the
Morea and the islands of the Archipelago, as well those who sail on the sea, as those
who dwell on land, and, in brief, you all who are thus in error and have embraced
the accursed plague of rebellion, throw away those arms from your hands – listen to
my fatherly voice which proceeds from my paternal affection – return to yourselves
– cast away from your thoughts the diabolical attempt of revolt – cast away, I repeat,
those arms, the cause of your destruction – return to obedience and submission – ask
forgiveness of the Lord God, our Saviour, in order to regain the love and protection
of the sultan, by such celestial intercession. Behold, this is the favorable moment
and time to acquire it; behold the moment and time of forgiveness! Change your
opinions, desire not the annihilation and destruction of your country, and the cruel
slavery of your innocent wives and children. Feel for yourselves, your country, your
children, your property; and what is more, think of your souls, and that Jesus Christ
himself shed his own blood on the cross for our salvation…
For the love of our Lord God, then, make all haste – send us petitions for pardon,
signed, and accompanied also by two or three persons from every town – and, for
the second time, we assure you, petitioners, collectively and individually, that not
the least harm will happen to you – and should any ensue, let it all fall on our
spiritual responsibility. We will be answerable to the divine tribunal for the least
blood that shall be spilt after this exhortation sent to you all with our hands and
signatures, so very confident and secure are we in the clemency, His Highness
cherishes towards his subjects…
FO 78/107, ff. 227-30, 25 April 1822 (No. 55)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Ottoman attack on Chios and the recapture of
that island by the kapudan pasha’s fleet.49]
…The Turkish expedition against Chios has been successful.
We are yet without complete details of this transaction, but from all that can be
collected, it seems to have been productive of dreadful scenes of carnage on both
sides.
On the first appearance of the kapudan pasha’s formidable fleet, the Greeks who
were stationed between Chesme, on the mainland, and Chios (to prevent the troops
assembled at the former place from crossing over), cut their cables, and effected
their escape, leaving Chios to its fate.
49 The kapudan pasha, or grand admiral and commander of the Ottoman fleet, led the naval
assault against Chios.
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This circumstance enabled six thousand of the Chesme troops to join the
kapudan pasha, who, on the 11th instant proceeded to summon the insurgents to
surrender, offering pardon to all who should lay down their arms, and giving them
eight hours to consider...his proposals.
The insurgents rejected this offer – and instantly attempted to carry the castle by
escalade, thinking that they could effect that object, and secure themselves in the
fortress before the kapudan pasha could have time to disembark his troops. In this
they were mistaken – they were vigorously repulsed by the garrison, and in the
meanwhile, the kapudan pasha landing about nine thousand men, and the former
making a sortie, they were enclosed between two fires; lost all their artillery,
amounting to twenty pieces, which was speedily turned against them, and after a
short and most bloody resistance, took to flight, and were pursued in all directions. It
is said that the loss on both sides amounts to fifteen thousand men. No quarter was
given after the action. Every person taken with arms in his hands was instantly put to
death. The women and children have been thrown into slavery. Previously to the
action, and on the first appearance of the fleet, the Catholic inhabitants had shut
themselves up in their convent. They have been protected by the kapudan pasha,
who has stationed a guard for their security, and who has received numbers of them
on board of his fleet, where they are treated with the utmost kindness. The Catholic
Greeks have, as Your Lordship is aware, never taken any part in the insurrection,
and, as well at Chios, as in all the other islands, have constantly maintained their
allegiance to the sultan.
The kapudan pasha has left a considerable body of troops on the island, who
will, I fear, pursue the work of destruction to the very utmost. The Samiote Greeks,
whose unfortunate expedition to Chios has been the cause of the calamity which has
overwhelmed that once happy and flourishing island, took no part in the combat, and
basely fled to Psara, hastily embarking on the side opposite to that where the
Turkish troops landed.
The kapudan pasha is said to have proceeded to the Morea, with the intention of
attacking some of the insurgent islands in his way.
I have the honour to enclose a translation of the placard which accompanied the
exhibition of heads, standards, and other trophies, sent to the Porte by Vahid Pasha,
the governor of Chios…
FO 78/108, ff. 29-34a, 10 May 1822 (No. 66)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the cruelties committed by the Turks at Chios.]
…The horrors of civil war were never more fearfully displayed than at Chios.
The fury of the Turkish troops was not to be restrained, and the greater part of that
delightful island, and all its flourishing and interesting establishments, have been
converted into a scene of the most appalling desolation. The villages producing the
mastic gum (a great source of the imperial revenue) have alone been spared. The
kapudan pasha appears to have done all that he could to check the cruelty of the
Turkish troops, and to save the inhabitants from its effects, by sending the British,
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Austrian, and French vice-consuls into the interior of the island, with exhortations to
the insurgents to lay down their arms, and to accept the proffered amnesty. These
missions were unsuccessful – the fury of the troops not permitting the consuls in
question to proceed on their way. The kapudan pasha has redeemed with his own
money a vast number of the wretched women and children whom the Turkish troops
had sold as slaves. This act of generous humanity is perfectly characteristic of this
most excellent man.
I am willing to spare myself the pain of recording in this dispatch, the various
horrors which were committed at Chios. I take the liberty of referring Your Lordship
to the two annexed gazettes, published at Smyrna, in which these dreadful details are
to be found.
Consul Werry’s letters to me, of the 3rd instant, are filled with similar accounts.
But he adds that “previously to the arrival of the Turkish fleet at Chios, the Greeks
had insulted and polluted the mosques, by every filthy contrivance which they could
devise, and had committed the most dreadful enormities on prisoners, women, and
children, in view of the garrison in the castle.”
Smyrna was perfectly tranquil at the date of my last letters from Mr. Werry…
Logotheti, who had assumed the title of prince, and who was the projector and
leader of the late unfortunate expedition of the Greeks against Chios, has been sent
in irons to Hydra, where he will be tried, and probably put to death, for having
defrauded the Greek treasury of fifty thousand sequins, which were found concealed
in an oven at his house in Samos.50 These Greek chieftains are, in truth, a set of most
unprincipled wretches…
FO 78/108, ff. 70-75, 25 May 1822 (No. 73)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the recent events on Chios and the observations of
Gianib Efendi in defense of Ottoman enslavement of the families of Chiote rebels.]
…The transactions at Chios appear to have been of a most horrible description,
and the ferocity of the Turks to have been carried to a pitch which makes humanity
shudder.
The whole of the island with the exception of the twenty-four mastic villages,
presents one mass of ruin.51

50 Lycurgus Logotheti (Logothetis), the reckless and inept adventurer who instigated the ill-fated
Samiote assault that declared Chios’s “deliverance” from Ottoman rule in March 1822,
proclaimed himself “savior” of Chios. But he failed to prepare the island’s defenses, bickered
with fellow “liberators,” fled when the Ottoman navy approached, and was incarcerated by
rebel leaders until December 1822. See Argenti, The Massacres of Chios, xii, xx-xxii; Brewer,
The Greek War of Independence, 156-58.
51 These mastic-producing areas did not escape for long. In a subsequent report, Strangford wrote
that “I am sorry to say that the mastic villages, which I mentioned in a former dispatch to have
been spared, have now shared the fate which has overwhelmed the rest of the island.” TNA, FO
78/108, ff. 153-59a, 10 June 1822 (No. 82).
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The unfortunate inhabitants have paid with their lives, the price of their illadvised rebellion. The only persons who have been spared are the women and
children, who have been sold as slaves. Hundreds of them were daily arriving at
Smyrna, at the date of my last letters from that place, and some ship-loads of these
unhappy victims reached this place during the last week.
All the hostages (with the exception of five Catholics) who were confined in the
castle of Chios have been put to death. It appears that four of these men were sent by
the Turkish commandant to their countrymen with an offer of pardon to such of
them as should lay down their arms. Instead of executing this commission, they
joined the insurgents, and availing themselves of the local knowledge acquired
during their residence in the castle, were the leaders of the attack against it. The fury
of the garrison was not to be restrained, and the remainder of the hostages were
instantly hanged.
The merchants of Smyrna sent an express to me and to the French ambassador,
with a request that we would exert our efforts to save the five Catholic prisoners
who remained in the castle, and whom the pasha promised to respite for twenty-five
days until orders could be received from Constantinople. We were so fortunate as to
succeed in our application, and a chiaus [state messenger or emissary] was
dispatched with a firman on Sunday last, authorizing the pasha to pardon the
individuals in question.
I wish I could say that I had been equally successful with respect to the
unfortunate captives who have been sent here from Chios. I sent M. Chabert with a
friendly message to Gianib Efendi on the subject, begging him to consider the
unfavourable effect which would be produced on the public mind in Europe by the
severities which the Porte was exercising against innocent and helpless persons, who
had taken no part in the rebellion, and who seemed to be rather entitled to the pity,
than to be considered as objects of the vengeance of the government.
Gianib Efendi received my application without any sign of impatience, but in
reply, he made some observations which he appeared to think quite unanswerable
and on which he dwelt with the utmost complacency. He said that the captives taken
at Chios, were condemned to slavery by the Mussulman laws and religion – which
not only permitted, but enjoined such a disposal of the wives and children of their
enemies – that without having the plea of law or religion, the Christian powers of
Europe had for ages tolerated slavery – not because their Messiah commanded it, but
because it was a source of gain – that it was true, England had abolished it, but that
it was only of late years that we had found out that it was wrong – and that half of
Europe still differed from our opinion on the subject – that if those powers had so
long endured the constant practice of the Turkish nation, and had not uttered a word
in reprobation of it for nearly four hundred years, it would indeed be singular if they
were now to call in question the right of the Mussulman government and nation to
do that which they had done from time immemorial, and which was, at present, more
than ever justified by the cruel and atrocious conduct of the Greek rebels, who, far
from making captives, spared neither women nor children. He added, that though he
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gave me full credit for the friendly spirit which had dictated my advice, he requested
me to remember that the Porte was an independent government – that she had a right
to act as she pleased towards her own subjects, except where treaties interfered, and
that the Mussulman nation would pursue and maintain its own laws and usages
without caring for the opinions of other states, which had no right to meddle with
them – that even Russia had never attempted to force Turkey to abolish slavery –
and that some time ago, when there was a long and vehement discussion between the
two courts respecting some Circassian slaves, the utmost to which Russia pretended
was, that those slaves should be free from the moment they landed in the Russian
territory – without seeking to impose upon Turkey the general principle that she was
not entitled to make slaves of her own subjects whenever she chose to do so.
“Slavery,” continued Gianib Efendi, “is a mode of punishment – and it might just
as well be said that we had not the right to inflict the punishment of death, or that of
the bastinado, upon offenders, as that the powers of Europe are to find fault with us
because we make captives of the families of those who are trying every means to
destroy our Empire. Why do not the Christian sovereigns interfere to prevent the
emperor of Russia from sending his subjects into Siberia? Because they know very
well what answer they would receive! Thus there is one law of humanity for Turkey
and another for Russia!”52
The same arguments were employed by Gianib Efendi to the Prussian dragoman,
whom Baron Miltitz [Prussia’s chargé d’affaires] had sent to him with a message
similar to mine, on the subject of the unfortunate captives from Chios…
FO 78/108, ff. 76-80a, 25 May 1822 (No. 74)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: divers intelligence from Constantinople, including
the execution of twenty-nine Greeks, the public beheading of ten Chiote hostages,
the conduct of the janissaries, and the enmity between Halet Efendi and Khurshid
Pasha.53]
52 For context and perspective on this interesting discussion of slavery, see Y. Hakan Erdem, Slavery
in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), especially
1-93; Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1998); idem, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: 1840-1890
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
53 Strangford’s correspondence of 1821-22 made frequent reference to these two prominent but rival
Ottoman leaders. As a close adviser to Mahmud II, Halet Efendi (Mehmed Said) supported the
sultan’s political drive to restore centralized absolute rule and to curb the powers of ayans or
provincial notables in Anatolia and the Balkans. In organizing some of the military expeditions
against regional chieftains, Halet sought to strengthen his own anti-reform base among the
janissaries and their allies and to eliminate contenders for power in the provinces. While he
ardently backed the suppression of Ali Pasha’s revolt, he worked against the sultan’s proposed
military reforms. A target of growing criticism because of Ottoman military setbacks in the
Peloponnese in 1821, Halet Efendi eventually fell from favor in the sultan’s inner circle. Exiled
from the capital, Halet Efendi was executed on the sultan’s orders in late 1822. Khurshid
Ahmed Pasha served as governor of the Morea, also as seraskier or commander in chief of
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…After so many months had passed in comparative quiet, we have again
witnessed in this capital some of those sanguinary scenes which disgraced it at the
beginning of the insurrection. On the 12th instant, sixteen Greeks of the lower class,
all natives of the Morea, were taken from the prison of the bostangi bashi [chief of
police]; and executed in various parts of Constantinople, and on the banks of the
canal. On the following day, thirteen more were put to death.
But the most tragical occurrence took place on the 18th, when, in spite of the
assurances so often given to me by the Porte, that she considered those unhappy men
as perfectly innocent, and that no offence could be alledged against them, the ten
Chiote hostages residing here, were publicly beheaded. They were all persons of
good repute, great connections in trade, particularly with the English merchants, and
of large and honourably acquired fortunes. Their fate is deeply regretted even by the
Turks; the better class of whom do not scruple to inveigh against this transaction, as
an act of unnecessary cruelty, and to attribute it entirely to the barbarous system of
terrorism which Halet Efendi pursues, for the sake of diverting public attention from
his own misdeeds.
The government alledges that it was necessary to sacrifice these unfortunate
men, to pacify the janissaries, who were made desperate by the account of the
cruelties perpetrated by the Greeks in sight of the besieged garrison of Chios, by the
intelligence of the second landing which was effected there by the insurgents – and
above all, by their wanton butchery of the crew of a Turkish boat which had been
sent in by the kapudan pasha with a flag of truce.
These proceedings on the part of the Greeks may certainly go far to account for,
but cannot justify an act, which fertile as this place has been in horrors, is beyond all
comparison, the one which I have witnessed with the greatest disgust and
indignation. I cannot express to Your Lordship the pain and concern which it has
occasioned to me. I had been in constant private communication with these poor
Chiotes. I had been so happy as to have rendered them some services during their
captivity, and I had flattered myself with the hope that my recommendations in their
favour could have been attended to – the more so as I am quite convinced that both
the reis efendi and Gianib [Efendi] were strongly and sincerely inclined to have
shewn mercy to them, and were making every effort to oppose the sanguinary
counsels of Halet…

Ottoman armies in Albania and Greece. He led the prolonged but ultimately victorious
campaign against Ali Pasha of Ioannina, sent the rebel’s severed head to the sultan, and
gathered an army to crush the Greek rising. But his political foes in Constantinople, especially
Halet Efendi, conspired against the successful commander and accused him of financial abuse
and malfeasance. After falling from grace, Khurshid Pasha committed suicide in late 1822. See
Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 430-31; Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 285-89, 314; Philliou, Biography of an
Empire, 43-44, 54-59, 75-77, 96-99, 103; Brewer, The Greek War of Independence, 47, 64-65,
88, 103, 109, 111-12, 166, 168, 179; Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821), 166,
171, 215, 229-32, 235-36, 238, 240-41, 263, 279, 336-38, 353.
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By a Tartar which arrived on the 22nd from Khurshid Pasha (who, it appears has
returned to Ioannina), accounts were received that he had succeeded in ransoming
his wife and children, who had been taken prisoners at Tripolitsa. To the great
surprise of everybody, an order has been sent by the sultan, for Khurshid’s family to
come immediately to Constantinople. This is a device of his enemy, Halet Efendi,
who hopes that Khurshid will resist this order, and thus incur the displeasure of the
sultan. Khurshid has lately forwarded to His Highness, a strong memorial against
Halet, which, however, has not been able to shake the favourite’s credit. But the
sultan has so high an opinion of Khurshid Pasha, and feels so grateful to him for the
successful termination of the war against Ali [Pasha], that Halet will probably find
that he is not an enemy to be despised. The animosity between these powerful
individuals is now carried so far, that the downfall of one of them must ensue…
FO 78/108, ff. 225-26, 25 June 1822 (No. 94)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: a recently discovered conspiracy to massacre the
Greeks of Constantinople.]
…The Christian inhabitants of this place have just had a most providential
escape from perhaps the most serious danger with which they have hitherto been
menaced.
A plan was laid by some of the more desperate of the yamaks [auxiliary troops or
irregulars], in conjunction with the lower order of janissaries, which if it had not
been discovered by the janissary aga, would probably have ended in an
indiscriminate massacre of all the Greeks. A party of these wretches had provided a
quantity of Greek dresses, in which disguise they meant to have sallied forth on the
last evening of the Ramazan [Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting], killing
and wounding such Turks as they might meet. Their design was thus to impress the
public and the government with the belief that there had been a general rising of the
Greeks, in hopes that orders would be immediately issued for the slaughter of that
population, which would have given them unbounded licence to pillage and plunder.
The secret meetings of these miscreants were (very appropriately) held at a
butcher’s shop in the quarter called Kumkapi.54 The janissary aga proceeded there
on the night of Wednesday last, caused the house to be surrounded by the second
regiment, and on entering it with a strong party of armed men, found several of the
yamaks in full deliberation on their infernal project. Twenty-one suits of Greek
cloathes were discovered in a chest. The criminals were conducted to the janissary
aga’s office, whence, after all of them had received the bastinado, four of the
ringleaders were sent to be strangled at the European castle on the Bosporus…

54 Kumkapi (Kum Kapi or “Sand Gate”), located in the Fatih district, along the Sea of Marmara, was
inhabited mostly by Armenians and housed the seat of the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople.
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FO 78/108, ff. 267-77, 25 June 1822 (No. 98)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: Metternich’s latest instructions to Austria’s
internuncio on the state of Russian-Ottoman relations, in particular the question of
an amnesty for Greek rebels.]
…Supposing the Porte to have once fairly fulfilled the terms of the ultimatum
(an epoch which I am willing to consider as close at hand), I think that then, an
attempt might be made, with a reasonable prospect of success, to obtain the second
point to which Prince Metternich’s “Memorandum” refers, namely, the renewal of
the amnesty, with the prescription of a certain time for its duration. This amnesty
might be drawn up in such a way, as to comprehend in general terms, all the benefits
in point of security to religion, life and property, and the impartial administration of
justice, which Russia is desirous of obtaining for the Greeks. But we must at first
expect to be told that the Porte has already vainly tried the effect of an amnesty –
that whenever she has been permitted, she has fairly acted upon it, and that it was
offered over and over again at Chios, and obstinately rejected there as well as
elsewhere. The proposal that the allies shall on their part, endeavour to induce the
Greeks to accept it, however generous in itself, and valuable to the Porte, will not, I
fear, be received without a certain degree of suspicion, by this jealous and
apprehensive government. In the first instance at least, the idea of making Christian
Europe a party to the pacification of her rebel subjects, will probably not be
acceptable to Turkish pride and fanaticism. Reasoning and friendly counsel may
subsequently cause it to be adopted. But, as the allies, by thus entering directly into
the question between the Porte and her subjects, may seem to render themselves
virtually answerable, towards the Porte, for the success of the measure which they
have proposed to it, and towards the Greeks for its being completely and honestly
fulfilled, I will own to Your Lordship that before the offer is made, I should be most
anxious to have such precise instructions as would enable me to say to the Porte how
far it was meant that the interference of the allies should extend, and whether in the
event of that interference being insufficient to induce the Greeks to submit, the Porte
would be allowed to reduce her rebel subjects in her own way. For, if the amnesty
fails, we may, by having proposed and offered to support it, appear to forfeit our
right of further intervention in behalf of mercy and humanity…
FO 78/109, ff. 136-37a, 10 August 1822 (No. 123)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the death of Ecumenical Patriarch Eugenius II and
the steps taken by the British ambassador to ensure the election of a successor.]
…On the morning of the 8th instant, the patriarch expired at his metropolitan
residence in Constantinople, after a long and painful illness, occasioned by dropsy
on the chest.
The ceremony of his funeral was attended by thousands of Greeks, and was
conducted with the greatest order, and with singular honours on the part of the
Turkish government. Before the interment, the corpse was placed, as is customary,
on the patriarchal throne in the cathedral; and I am assured that upwards of eight
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thousand Greeks attended in the course of the day, for the purpose of kissing the
hands and feet of their deceased chief.
Immediately upon learning this event (which was within half an hour after it had
taken place), I sent my fourth dragoman to the Porte, with a confidential message to
the reis efendi, earnestly conjuring the Porte to observe with the most scrupulous
exactness all the formalities which had usually been practised on the election of a
patriarch, [so] that the enemies of this government might not have to alledge
anything against its conduct upon this occasion. The reis efendi appeared to take this
friendly communication as it was meant, and he directed Mr. Frederick Pisani to
assure me, that the Porte knew its own interests too well, and valued the good
opinion of the Christian powers too highly, not to have resolved to act in this affair
with every degree of attention and deference to the usages of the Greek Church.
A synod of Greek bishops was convened on the evening of the patriarch’s death
– at which the congé d’elire [the licence or permission to elect a successor] of the
Porte was produced. The choice of the new patriarch was then privately made, but it
is not yet generally announced…
FO 78/109, ff. 187-90, 10 August 1822 (No. 129)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the selection of a new patriarch (Anthimos III) and
the Porte’s commendable conduct on this occasion.]
…I was mistaken in supposing that the synod held immediately after the late
patriarch’s death, had then proceeded to elect his successor.
The election did not take place untill this morning, when a second synod was
convened, under the auspices of the archbishop of Jerusalem. Twelve Greek bishops
were present, and on this occasion, the six prelates who have been so long detained
as hostages at the Seraglio, were set at liberty. The choice of the assembly fell upon
one of these, namely, Anthimos, Bishop of Chalcedon.55
The Porte had previously declared by a letter to the synod, that there would be no
objection to the nomination of one of the detained prelates, provided he should
appear to the synod to possess the five qualities of experience – prudence – ability –
learning – and loyalty to the sultan.
Sixty-three names were read over in the synod. Of these, only three were
considered as fit candidates.
The election appears to have been effected by the Greek natives at
Constantinople, as represented by the esnaffs or corporations [artisan and merchant
guilds]. Six hundred of these persons voted on the occasion; and their choice was
afterwards ratified by the synod of prelates. No one attended on the part of the new
princes; but as it is an ancient custom for the agents of these personages, residents at
55 On Patriarch Anthimos III, see Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 53, 63.
Chalcedon (Kadiköy today), an episcopal see near Constantinople and the site of the Fourth
Ecumenical Council (451), is located on the Asian side of the Sea of Marmara and close to the
mouth of the Bosporus.
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Constantinople, to sanction the election of a new patriarch, Yahya Efendi, the
dragoman of the Porte, who sits pro tempore in that capacity, for the lately
appointed hospodars, read a letter from them to the synod, announcing their
acquiescence in any choice that the assembly might think proper to make.56
The patriarch will be invested with the kaftan tomorrow, at the Porte.57
It is satisfactory to observe that in the whole of this transaction, the Ottoman
government has acted with so much prudence and propriety, and with such
scrupulous attention to the rights and privileges of the Greek National Church…
FO 78/109, ff. 233-35a, 19 August 1822 (No. 135)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the installment ceremony for the new patriarch.]
…I am happy to inform Your Lordship that the Turkish ministers have
concluded the affair of the patriarch’s election, in the same spirit of liberality and
good taste (if the expression be permitted) with which they had begun it.
On the evening of the 10th, the Porte having been informed by a petition from the
Greek community in this capital that Anthimos, Bishop of Chalcedon, had been
elected patriarch, orders were sent to remove that prelate from the apartments of the
bostangi bashi, where he had been in confinement, to his own house in the Phanar,
or Greek quarter of Constantinople.
On the morning of the 11th, he was conducted with great pomp to the Porte,
where he received from the grand vizier’s hands, the kaftan, and the act confirming
his election. He was accompanied by twelve bishops and five deans. During this
ceremony, it was noticed that many unusual attentions were practised towards him
and the prelates who accompanied him. He was allowed to be seated in the vizier’s
presence – and the usual Turkish refreshments were offered to him – distinctions
which though apparently trifling, excited much notice, as they had never been shewn
to any former patriarch.
After he had received the kaftan, similar robes of honour were (to the great
surprise of the spectators) presented to the attending prelates. A procession was then
formed from the Porte to the patriarchal residence, through the most populous parts
of Constantinople. It was conducted with perfect order, under the direction and with
the personal attendance of five of the chief officers in the Seraglio…who had never
assisted on previous occasions of this nature. The patriarch and all the bishops were
mounted on horses from the grand vizier’s stables. Formerly it was the custom to

56 Bulgarazde Yahya Efendi, a Muslim convert of Bulgarian Christian descent and a professor of
military engineering, became grand dragoman of the Porte in 1822. The outbreak of the Greek
revolt prompted the sultan to replace Greek Phanariotes with non-Greeks for such positions as
hospodars and dragomans, and Yahya Efendi’s knowledge of languages equipped him well for
his new appointment. See Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 84, 91-95, 220-21.
57 The patriarch, like other newly appointed high-ranking Ottoman dignitaries, received a kaftan
or robe of honor from the sultan during the official ceremony that invested him with his new
office and title. See Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 23-24, 195.
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permit only the patriarch and the two bishops who are styled his godfathers, to
appear on horseback during this procession.
On reaching the metropolitan church, the ceremony of the patriarch’s instalment
took place in the presence and amidst the acclamations of at least eight thousand
persons belonging to the Greek nation…
I ought to mention that the sultan and all his ministers have dispensed with the
usual homage fees on the election of the patriarch. They amount to two hundred
thousand piastres. I am also informed that the sultan, apprehensive that the loss of
their share of these profits, would indispose the inferior officers of the Seraglio
towards the new patriarch, caused them to be reimbursed from the Imperial
Treasury. I hope this anecdote is true…
FO 78/109, ff. 237-38, 19 August 1822 (No. 136)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the pastoral letter read in all the Greek churches by
order of the newly selected patriarch.]
…I had finished my preceding dispatches when I received a copy of a pastoral
letter which was read yesterday in all the Greek churches by command of the
patriarch. I have not time to prepare a translation of it.
This pastoral letter begins with announcing that the Porte has consented to the
renewal of the panegyrs, or religious feasts [feast days or festivals of saints] of the
Greeks, which were formerly held alternately, in the various churches and chapels in
the vicinity of Constantinople. The vast multitudes which were in the practice of
attending these assemblies, caused them to be considered with suspicion by the
government and they have been accordingly suspended since the beginning of the
insurrection. They are now to be revived, and the patriarch declares that they are
under the special protection of the government.
The letter then proceeds to adjure the Greeks in the most forcible terms, not to
expose themselves to certain danger by imprudent attempts to emigrate, which are
always found out, and only serve to involve the individuals concerned in them, in
greater perils than any they would be exposed to by remaining peaceably at
Constantinople.
The patriarch concludes with recommending modesty and economy in dress to
the females of his communion…
FO 78/109, ff. 254-57, 26 August 1822 (No. 140)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the envoy’s discussions with reis efendi on the
Chios disaster.]
…The reis efendi, who in common with many of his colleagues, deplores the
conduct of the Turkish troops at Chios, and who I can conscientiously assert, feels
ashamed of the disgrace which it has brought upon his country, appeared to be
greatly affected by the unreserved expression of His Majesty’s sentiments upon the
subject. But he endeavoured to justify his government by urging the unremitting
cruelties which the Greeks had perpetrated in the Morea – the massacre of the
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Turkish garrisons at Corinth – Tripolitsa – Navarino – and Athens – the unprovoked
murder of the officers sent to Chios by the kapudan pasha with the proposed
amnesty – the insults offered to the mosques in that island, and all the various
circumstances of atrocity in which I lament to say, that the Greek war has been but
too abundant.
Almost all the arguments employed by the reis efendi when I mentioned the
affair of Chios at my last conference, were again produced upon this occasion, and,
as Your Lordship will have perceived from my report of that conference, they
consisted in little more than a series of attempts to justify one system of barbarity by
the existence of another, and to prove that the right of making slaves was founded on
the Mussulman law, and was certainly not in opposition at this day, to the avowed or
secret practice of some of the Christian states.
My dragoman was perfectly able, and what is more, perfectly willing to meet the
reis efendi upon this ground, and from his report of what passed, it appears that the
reis efendi was obliged at last to rest his justification of the enormities committed at
Chios, on the treason of the inhabitants, and on the fact of the descent upon that
island not having been a spontaneous and sudden movement on the part of the
Samiotes, but the result of a concerted plan, and of an urgent invitation to the
insurgents at Samos from their brethren at Chios. The reis efendi said that he could
prove from documents in his possession, that this correspondence had been carried
on for several months. Unfortunately, it did not occur to M. Chabert to ask why, if
that was the case, the Turkish government did not take measures to prevent the
descent, of which by their own confession, they were forewarned, instead of leaving
the island absolutely without defence, and at the mercy of the first invader.
On the subject of the Chiote hostages, the same accusations were urged against
them, which the reis efendi introduced on the occasion of my conference.
I feel assured that the manner in which this affair has been taken up, and the
unequivocal and downright manner in which I have expressed His Majesty’s
sentiments respecting it, cannot have failed to produce the strongest effects upon the
minds of the Turkish ministers, and that these effects will be perceptible in the future
conduct of the Porte towards her revolted subjects. They are now no strangers to the
detestation with which their cruelty has been viewed throughout that country which
they look upon to be their most sincere and disinterested friend, and whose good
opinion, I cannot help flattering myself, that they will now make an effort to
recover…
FO 78/110, ff. 85-92, 5 October 1822 (No. 150)
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British ambassador’s communication with the
Porte on the subject of Russian-Ottoman disputes, in particular the question of an
amnesty for Greek insurgents.]
…However discouraging the official language of the Ottoman ministers may
have been, I have been greatly consoled by the private and confidential
communications which I received from some of them… I will beg to refer you to the
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enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Wood, the chancellor of His Majesty’s embassy,
in which he reports to me the details of a conference which Ismail Efendi held, at my
request with Gianib Efendi. I will own to you, Sir, that my opinion of these
individuals, as men of probity and honour, is so high, that I attach as much value to
this communication as if it had been made in a more formal and authentic shape. In
point of fact, the substance of it was reduced to writing, and delivered to Mr. Wood
by Ismail Efendi, who was formerly the Turkish ambassador in England, and who is
the steady and sincere friend of our country and government.58
You will perceive, Sir, from this communication, that Gianib Efendi (the most
efficient member of the Ottoman ministry) has confidentially explained the reasons
which have deterred the Porte from proclaiming by a new act, the amnesty which
she is willing to offer to her revolted subjects – at the same time that he has
positively assured me that the line which the sultan has resolved to follow with
respect to them, is precisely that which the allies have required – an assurance,
which I am formally requested to give, in His Highness’s name, and under the
sanction of his word, in any communications which I may have at Vienna, with the
chiefs of the allied cabinets. To this declaration is added a promise, that out of
personal consideration for His Majesty’s ambassador, the Porte is inclined to listen
favourably to his intercession in behalf of such of the insurgents as the fortune of
war may place at her disposal.
Prince Metternich expressed very great satisfaction on the perusal of this
document, which is certainly calculated to inspire a confident hope that though the
Porte refrains from publishing a new proclamation of amnesty, its future conduct
towards the revolted Greeks will be conformable to the wishes of the allies, and to
the interests of humanity…
[Strangford attached this letter (FO 78/110, ff. 100-03, 5 September 1822) from
embassy chancellor or secretary George Wood, who described the recent conference
between Ismail Efendi and Gianib Efendi on the Porte’s future policy towards the
Greek insurrectionists.]
…On the subject of the amnesty, Gianib Efendi requested Your Lordship not to
impute to obstinacy, or want of confidence, the unwillingness of the Porte to issue
anew such a proclamation, at Your Lordship’s request. By so doing, they think that
they would in some degree make Your Lordship a party to it, and that disputes might
hereafter arise between Your Excellency and the Porte, on any apparent infraction of
58 George Wood, a British-born dragoman at the embassy, became Strangford’s able and
confidential assistant. He entrusted Wood not just with secret talks with Ismail Ferruh Efendi
but with private correspondence regarding the ambassador’s diplomatic efforts to mediate the
Ottoman-Greek conflict. Ismail Efendi served as ambassador to England (1797-1802) before
becoming a confidant of Halet Efendi and an influential adviser of Mahmud II. See Berridge,
British Diplomacy in Turkey, 53, 58; Prousis, Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821),
229-36, 240, 274-75; Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçinkaya, The First Permanent Ottoman Embassy in
Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797) (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010),
27, 101, 120-21, 154, 156-57, 181, 184, 210.
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the amnesty, such as the execution of the chiefs of the rebellion, of whom the Porte
is determined to make a severe example, if ever she succeeds in catching them.
These chiefs are known to have had criminal relations with the agents of a certain
foreign power. The proofs of the fact are now in the hands of the sultan. If these
chiefs should be taken, the minister of that power will certainly interpose in their
behalf, and as certainly, his intervention will be rejected. He will then make a
quarrel between the English ambassador and the Porte, by pretending that these
chiefs were included in the amnesty, to which the former was a sort of guaranteeing
party.
But, Gianib added that while the sultan is determined to punish the wretches who
have led the reaya into error, and who have occasioned so much desolation and
misery, he is equally determined not to treat the poor deluded people with severity.
They shall be forgiven, and they shall receive every degree of favour and indulgence
hitherto accorded to them by the Mussulman law. Your Lordship is not only
authorized, but requested to make this assurance in the most positive form to
the allied ministers at Vienna – and to give to it the sanction of the solemn word
of the sultan and of the Porte. Your Lordship is strongly urged to make a faithful
report of the favour and kindness shewn by the Porte to its reaya at Constantinople,
of the protection accorded to their religious rites – and of the execution within the
last months of five hundred Turks, for oppressing or insulting them – to say nothing
of the thousands which have been banished for no other offence…

